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Abstract
Wealthier individuals engage in healthier behavior. This paper seeks to explain
this phenomenon by developing a theory of health behavior, and exploiting both
lottery winnings and inheritances to test the theory. We distinguish between the
direct monetary cost and the indirect health cost (value of health lost) of unhealthy
consumption. The health cost increases with wealth and the degree of unhealthiness,
leading wealthier individuals to consume more healthy and moderately unhealthy,
but fewer severely unhealthy goods. The empirical evidence presented suggests
that differences in health costs may indeed provide an explanation for behavioral
differences, and ultimately health outcomes, between wealth groups.
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1 Introduction
Unhealthy lifestyles and unhealthy consumption are more prevalent among the poor,
and account for a large fraction of the substantial socioeconomic disparities in health
(Contoyannis and Jones 2004; Cutler et al. 2011). More affluent individuals are less
likely to smoke, drink heavily, be overweight, and use illegal drugs, and are more likely
to exercise and engage in preventive care (e.g., Cutler and Lleras-Muney 2010; Cutler et
al. 2011). A phenomenon of particular interest is that richer people tend to engage more
in moderately unhealthy behaviors, such as drinking moderately,1 but less in severely
unhealthy behaviors, such as excessive alcohol consumption (Cutler and Lleras-Muney
2010). What explains these differences in health behaviors across wealth groups remains
largely unclear (Cutler et al. 2011).
The lack of understanding of the causes of observed differences in health behavior
across wealth groups may be due to two main limitations of the existing literature. First,
theoretical models of consumption and saving have difficulty explaining differences in
(un)healthy consumption across wealth groups. In these models, wealth enables more
consumption, and the quantity purchased is governed by the monetary price of the
good, permanent income and wealth, as well as preferences. Unless preferences differ
substantially, these models would predict that wealthier individuals would engage more,
not less, in unhealthy consumption. A second limitation is that empirical findings are
usually limited to correlations, and are not necessarily indicative of a causal effect of
wealth or income on health behaviors.2
This paper attempts to address both the theoretical and empirical limitations. We
present a theory of health behavior based on the human capital theory of the demand for
health investment (Grossman 1972). By explicitly considering the health consequences
of consumption, our health-capital theory predicts differences in health behaviors across
wealth groups and provides a possible explanation for the observation that wealthy
individuals are less likely to drink excessively but more likely to drink moderately (e.g.,
Cutler et al. 2011).
According to our theory, the decision to engage in unhealthy consumption is governed
by the monetary cost (i.e. the price of a pack of cigarettes) as well as a health cost
(i.e. value of health lost). The model predicts that wealth has two effects. First,
there is the familiar direct effect: wealth allows individuals to purchase more (unhealthy)
consumption goods. But there is also an indirect effect: the health cost increases in the
“unhealthiness” of the good and in health investment, and is therefore higher for wealthier
individuals and for more severely unhealthy goods. The direct and the indirect wealth
1Some studies suggest that drinking moderately may be beneficial to one’s health (e.g., Fuller 2011).
2Related to our research, studies have shown that smoking and drinking may affect wages (e.g., Auld
2005; Cawley and Ruhm 2011), and so reverse causality from health behaviors to wealth may be present.
Also factors such as the degree of cognition, forward orientation (time preference), risk aversion, etc. may
simultaneously influence wealth and health behaviors causing a spurious association. In this paper we
focus solely on causality running from wealth to health behaviors.
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effect compete and while the net effect is ambiguous, wealthy individuals are likely to
engage more in moderately (direct wealth effect dominates) and less in severely unhealthy
consumption (indirect health cost effect dominates). The theory can thus provide a
possible explanation for the observed positive association between wealth and moderately
unhealthy consumption and the negative association with severely unhealthy consumption.
Our theory further predicts that the strength of the response to an unexpected wealth
shock is smallest for the wealthy and for a high degree of unhealthiness of the consumption
good, and that health and age also matter in decisions regarding unhealthy consumption
goods.
The second part of the paper employs the theory to inform the empirical specifications
and estimates the effect of wealth on healthy and unhealthy consumption for different
wealth, health and age groups. In doing so, we contribute to a relatively small literature
which seeks to estimate the effect of variation in wealth or income on health behavior.3
Ettner (1996) exploits state unemployment rates, work experience, parental education,
and spousal characteristics as instruments for income using US data. She finds that the
probability of drinking any alcohol increases with income, although the validity of the
instruments used has been questioned (e.g., Kawachi et al. 2010). Adda et al. (2009)
exploit skill-based technology changes in income at the cohort level using three English
repeated cross-sectional surveys. The authors report that permanent income shocks lead to
poorer health behavior – an increase in the number of cigarettes smoked, in the probability
of being a smoker, and in alcohol consumption. Kenkel et al. (2011) exploit the Earned
Income Tax Credit (EITC) – the United States’ second largest antipoverty program for
the non-elderly, which showed considerable variation in timing and benefit level across
states over the years 1993 to 2007 – to estimate the impact of sudden shocks in disposable
income among low-income households. They find an increase in smoking participation
upon a positive income shock.
Apouey and Clark (2010) use lottery winnings from the British Household Panel Survey
(BHPS) and find that those who win higher amounts are more likely to smoke and engage
in social drinking. Kim and Ruhm (2012) use the US Health and Retirement Study (HRS)
to distinguish between small and big inheritances, where small inheritances are defined
as those below $10,000 US dollars. They identify wealth shocks on the basis of “large”
inheritances, and find that wealth shocks increase out-of-pocket medical expenditures and
alcohol consumption, but do not affect smoking or exercising. Yet, for both studies there
may be unobserved differences across those that receive large and small amounts from
either a lottery win or an inheritance that is not accounted for.
We contribute to the empirical literature in three ways. First, we use a
more conservative and robust approach than the extant literature by including
individual-specific fixed effects, by estimating a number of different specifications, and
exploiting both lottery winnings and inheritances. Second, in contrast to previous work,
3We here review the literature that investigates the effect of wealth on health behaviors, as this is the
main focus of our paper. A related literature has investigated the effect of wealth on health outcomes (e.g.,
Adams et al. 2003; Meer et al. 2003; Lindahl 2005; Snyder and Evans 2006; Schwandt 2011).
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we focus on detailed analyses of subgroups. Motivated by the predictions of our theory we
explore differences in health behavior among wealth, health and age groups. In particular,
our aim is to examine our hypothesis that health costs matter in decisions regarding health
behavior. Third, we replicate the analyses of Apouey and Clark (2010) and Kim and Ruhm
(2012) and present evidence suggesting that their prior estimates of the causal impact of
wealth on health behaviors may not have fully accounted for unobserved heterogeneity.
The empirical evidence suggests that differences in health costs may provide an
explanation for observed behavioral differences between wealth groups. A wealth increase
leads to more moderately unhealthy consumption such as moderate drinking for all
individuals, but no change in heavy drinking. The effects on severely unhealthy
consumption, such as smoking and the number of cigarettes, are stronger among the least
wealthy. The findings further suggest that health status is very important in explaining
health behavior: only among individuals in good health do we find strong increases in
unhealthy behavior, suggesting that the health cost of unhealthy consumption is smaller
among the healthy.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 formulates a theory of wealth, health
and consumption patterns, and discusses predictions. Section 3 presents the data and
empirical methodology. Section 4 presents the results, and section 5 provides a summary
and discussion.
2 A theory of wealth, health, and unhealthy consumption
2.1 Theoretical formulation
Our model is based on Galama and Van Kippersluis (2010), and builds on the human
capital theory of the demand for health investment (Grossman 1972) with two important
extensions. First, we use a health production process that is subject to diminishing returns
to scale. This addresses the indeterminacy of the solutions for investment and health that
characterizes commonly employed linear investment models (Ehrlich and Chuma 1990;
Galama 2011). It is further attractive in that the health investment process is generally
thought of as being subject to diminishing returns (Wagstaff 1986). Second, we explicitly
model the effect of consumption on health through its effect on the biological aging rate.4
We distinguish healthy consumption (such as the consumption of healthy foods, sports and
exercise) from unhealthy consumption (such as smoking, excessive alcohol consumption).
Healthy consumption provides utility and is associated with health benefits in that it
lowers the biological aging rate. Unhealthy consumption provides utility but increases the
biological aging rate.
4Forster (2001) and Case and Deaton (2005) have also modeled unhealthy consumption as a choice
variable affecting health deterioration. In these models, the price of unhealthy consumption is solely in
terms of the consequences to health, i.e. there is no monetary cost of unhealthy consumption and thus no
direct wealth effect.
4
Individuals maximize the life-time utility function∫ T
0
U [Ch(t), Cu(t), H(t)]e
−βtdt, (1)
where T denotes the life span, assumed exogenous for simplicity,5 β is a subjective
discount factor and individuals derive utility from healthy consumption Ch(t), unhealthy
consumption Cu(t) and from health H(t). Time t is measured from the time an individual
has completed her education and joined the labor force. Utility increases with healthy
consumption ∂U/∂Ch > 0, unhealthy consumption ∂U/∂Cu > 0, and with health
∂U/∂H > 0, but at a decreasing rate ∂2U/∂C2h < 0, ∂
2U/∂C2u < 0, and ∂
2U/∂H2 < 0.
The objective function (1) is maximized subject to the following dynamic equations,6
H˙(t) = µI(t)I(t)
α − d[t, Ch(t), Cu(t); ξ(t)]H(t), (2)
A˙(t) = δA(t) + Y [H(t)]− pCh(t)Ch(t)− pCu(t)Cu(t)− pI(t)I(t), (3)
and we have initial and end conditions: H(0), H(T ), A(0) and A(T ) are given.
H˙(t) and A˙(t) in equations (2) and (3) denote time derivatives of health H(t) and
assets A(t). Health (equation 2) can be improved through investment in health I(t), and
deteriorates at the biological aging rate d(t). The health-production function µI(t)I(t)
α
has an efficiency µI(t), and exhibits diminishing returns to scale (DRTS; 0 < α < 1). The
biological aging rate depends endogenously on healthy consumption Ch(t) and unhealthy
consumption Cu(t), and on a vector of exogenous variables ξ(t) (e.g., environmental
conditions). Consumption can be healthy (∂d/∂Ch ≤ 0) or unhealthy (∂d/∂Cu > 0).
Assets A(t) (equation 3) provide a return δ (the return to capital), increase with
income Y (t) and decrease with purchases of healthy consumption goods Ch(t), unhealthy
consumption goods Cu(t), and health investment I(t), at prices pCh(t), pCu(t), and pI(t),
respectively. Income Y (t) is assumed to be an increasing and concave function of health
H(t) (∂Y/∂H > 0, and ∂2Y/∂H2 < 0). Last, we assume that individuals face no borrowing
constraints.
Thus, we have the following optimal control problem: the objective function (1) is
maximized with respect to the control functions Ch(t), Cu(t), and I(t), subject to the
constraints (2) and (3). The Hamiltonian (see, e.g., Seierstad and Sydsaeter 1987) of this
problem is:
= = U(t)e−βt + qH(t)H˙(t) + qA(t)A˙(t), (4)
where qH(t) is the marginal value of health H(t) (in utils per unit of health) and qA(t) is
the marginal value of assets A(t) (in utils per monetary unit).
5The predictions for a model including endogenous life span are similar. See Galama and Van
Kippersluis (2010) for detail.
6For simplicity of exposition, we omit the time components and time constraint in the production of
consumption and health investment. The theoretical predictions with respect to wealth are unaffected.
See Galama and Van Kippersluis (2010) for the full model.
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2.2 First-order conditions
Derivations of the first-order conditions can be found in appendix A. The first-order
condition for maximization of (4) with respect to the control function health investment
can be written as
∂piI(t)
∂t
= piI(t) [d(t) + δ]−
[
1
qA(0)
∂U
∂H
e−(β−δ)t +
∂Y
∂H
]
, (5)
where qA(0) is the marginal value (or shadow prize) of initial wealth, and piI(t) is the
marginal cost of health investment I(t)
piI(t) ≡ pI(t)I(t)
1−α
αµI(t)
. (6)
The marginal cost of health investment increases with the price of investment goods and
services pI(t) and with the level of investment I(t), due to DRTS in the health production
process µI(t)I(t)
α (0 < α < 1; see equation 2).
The first-order condition for maximization of (4) with respect to the control function
healthy consumption is
∂U
∂Ch
= qA(0) [pCh(t)− ϕdCh(t)] e(β−δ)t, (7)
where pCh(t) is the price of healthy consumption Ch(t), representing the direct monetary
cost of consumption, and ϕdCh(t) is the marginal health benefit of healthy consumption
ϕdCh(t) ≡ −piI(t)
∂d
∂Ch
H(t). (8)
The marginal health benefit of healthy consumption ϕdCh(t) represents the marginal
monetary value of health saved: it is the product of the marginal cost of health investment
piI(t) and the marginal amount of health “saved” [∂d(t)/∂Ch(t)]H(t). The marginal health
benefit can be understood intuitively as the savings in health investment that would
have had to be made if consumption had no effect on health.7 Compared to a model in
which consumption has no health consequences, the “full” price (marginal cost) of healthy
consumption is lower because of its health benefit (see 7).
7An alternative interpretation of the first-order condition for healthy consumption (7) follows from
rewriting it as
∂U
∂Ch
e−βt + qH(t)
[
− ∂d
∂Ch
]
H(t) = qA(t)pCh(t). (9)
Thus the optimality condition requires the sum of the discounted marginal benefit of consumption
(discounted marginal utility) and the marginal health benefit (the marginal value of health qH(t) times
the marginal amount of health “saved” −[∂d/∂Ch]H(t)) to equal the marginal cost of consumption (the
marginal value of wealth qA(t) times the marginal reduction in wealth, i.e. the price of consumption
pCh(t)).
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Similarly, the first-order condition for maximization of (4) with respect to the control
function unhealthy consumption is
∂U
∂Cu
= qA(0) [pCu(t) + pidCu(t)] e
(β−δ)t, (10)
where pCu(t) is the price of unhealthy consumption Cu(t) (direct monetary cost) and
pidCu(t) is the marginal health cost of unhealthy consumption
pidCu(t) ≡ piI(t)
∂d
∂Cu
H(t). (11)
Compared to a model in which consumption has no health consequences, the “full” price
(marginal cost) of unhealthy consumption is higher because of its health cost (monetary
value of health lost; see 10).
2.3 Predictions
In order to predict the effect of an unanticipated wealth shock we compute the comparative
dynamic effect of an infinitesimally small change in initial wealth A0. The comparative
dynamic effect is obtained by taking the derivative of the first-order conditions (5), (7),
and (10), and the dynamic health equation (2) with respect to A0.
Assuming first-order effects dominate higher-order effects,8 the comparative dynamic
effect of initial wealth on healthy consumption can be summarized as (see Appendix B for
detail):
∂Ch
∂A0
= λCh(t)×
[
UCh
qA(0)
∂qA(0)
∂A0
− ϕdCh(t)
piI(t)
∂piI
∂A0
− ϕdCh(t)
H(t)
∂H
∂A0
]
, (12)
where λCh(t) =
[
UChCh − qA(0)piI(t)dChChH(t)e(β−δ)t
]−1
< 0,9 Ux = ∂U/∂x, Uxx =
∂2U/∂x2, dxx = ∂
2d/∂x2, and the marginal health benefit ϕdCh(t) is defined in (8). Thus,
the impact of wealth on healthy consumption can be decomposed into the impact of
wealth on (i) the marginal value of lifetime wealth qA(0), (ii) the marginal cost of health
investment piI(t), and (iii) the health stock H(t).
The first term between brackets on the RHS of equation (12) represents the direct
wealth effect, which is positive under the assumption of diminishing returns to wealth
(∂qA(0)/∂A0 < 0)
10: an increase in wealth allows more healthy consumption. Yet, wealth
8This amounts to assuming that, for example, the direct effect of a change in wealth on healthy
consumption is larger than the indirect effect of wealth on unhealthy consumption and unhealthy
consumption in turn on healthy consumption.
9This would be true under the plausible assumptions of diminishing marginal utility of healthy
consumption (UChCh < 0) and diminishing marginal health benefit of healthy consumption (dChCh > 0).
10This assumption is commonly employed in the literature and implies that lifetime utility has
diminishing returns to wealth, i.e. ∂qA(0)
∂A0
= ∂
2
∂A20
∫ T
0
U(∗)e−βt < 0, where U(∗) is the maximized utility
function (see, e.g., Caputo 2005).
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also has an indirect effect through the second and third term between brackets on the
RHS. In appendix B we show that an increase in wealth leads to a higher marginal cost of
health investment piI(t) (wealth leads to higher health investment and therefore a higher
marginal cost of investment; see equation (6)), at least initially, and better health H(t).
Given the coefficients in (12), in particular λCh(t) < 0 and ϕdCh(t) > 0, both the direct
and indirect effects operate in the same direction, and the initial response to an increase
in wealth is to increase demand for healthy consumption: ∂Ch∂A0 > 0.
The comparative dynamic effect of initial wealth on unhealthy consumption can be
summarized as (see Appendix B for detail):
∂Cu
∂A0
= λCu(t)×
[
UCu
qA(0)
∂qA(0)
∂A0
+
pidCu(t)
piI(t)
∂piI
∂A0
+
pidCu(t)
H(t)
∂H
∂A0
]
, (13)
where λCu(t) =
[
UCuCu − qA(0)piI(t)dCuCuH(t)e(β−δ)t
]−1
< 0.11 and the marginal health
cost pidCu(t) is defined in (11). Similar to healthy consumption, additional wealth enables
purchases of more unhealthy consumption goods – the direct wealth effect (first term on the
RHS of 13). Yet, additional wealth also increases the marginal cost of health investment
piI(t) and health H(t) and thus the marginal health cost of unhealthy consumption pidCu(t)
(the indirect wealth effect; second and third term between brackets on the RHS of 13):
the indirect wealth effect competes with the direct wealth effect.
While we cannot a priori sign the relation between unhealthy consumption and
wealth, the two competing effects predict an interesting pattern of behavior. The health
cost increases in the severity of its impact on health, pidCu(t) ∝ ∂d∂Cu (the degree of
“unhealthiness” of the consumption good). This suggests that for moderately unhealthy
goods the direct wealth effect might dominate, while for severely unhealthy goods the
indirect wealth effect might dominate. This implies that an increase in wealth may lead
to increased demand for moderately unhealthy consumption goods and reduced demand
for severely unhealthy consumption goods.
We also expect the impact of a wealth shock on unhealthy consumption to be smaller
among wealthier individuals for two reasons. First, the direct effect of a given absolute
wealth shock is smaller among wealthier individuals (diminishing returns to wealth).
Second, wealthier individuals invest more in health, are in better health, and as a result
have a higher health cost for a given degree of “unhealthiness” of the good. The larger the
health cost compared to the monetary cost, the smaller the behavioral response is toward
a wealth shock. This is because the direct wealth effect operates primarily through the
marginal value of wealth qA(t) in the expression for the monetary cost qA(t)pCu(t), which
11This amounts to assuming diminishing marginal utility of unhealthy consumption (UCuCu < 0) and
constant or increasing returns to scale in the health cost of unhealthy consumption (i.e. dCuCu ≥ 0), or
that the term qA(0)piI(t)dCuCue
(β−δ)t is small compared to UCuCu . It is plausible that the health cost of
unhealthy consumption exhibits constant or increasing returns to scale (e.g., Forster 2001). In contrast to
healthy consumption, which has a natural upper bound to the amount of health it can produce, the health
detriment of unhealthy consumption has no natural lower bound. In simplistic terms, consuming fruits
and vegetables does not lead to eternal life, but smoking does kill.
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is a first-order effect (i.e., responsive to changes in wealth), while the indirect health cost
effect operates primarily through the marginal value of health qH(t) in the expression
for the health cost qH(t)∂d/∂CuH(t), which is a second-order (indirect) effect (i.e., less
responsive to wealth). A large (unresponsive) health cost dampens the direct wealth effect.
The theoretical predictions with respect to health and age are ambiguous. The
marginal health cost of unhealthy consumption pidCu(t) is the product of the marginal
cost of health investment piI(t) and the change in health due to consumption
∂d
∂Cu
H(t).
The marginal cost of health investment increases in wealth and decreases in health, and
one would expect the wealthy and least healthy to invest more in health, a pattern that
is broadly observed.12 While the marginal cost of health investment may be smaller for
those in good health, the change in health due to consumption ∂d∂CuH(t) increases in the
health stock. As a result it is unclear whether the health cost of unhealthy consumption
increases or decreases in health.
Similarly, while the observed increases in medical care expenditures (health
investment) toward the end of life suggest that the marginal cost of health investment
piI(t) increases with age, the health cost of unhealthy consumption also depends on the
relationship with age of the change in health due to unhealthy consumption ∂d∂CuH(t). The
latter plausibly decreases with age as health declines.
In sum, the theory provides us with the following two main predictions:
1. An unexpected wealth shock leads to increased demand for healthy and moderately
unhealthy consumption goods, but decreased demand for severely unhealthy goods.
2. The strength of the response to an unexpected wealth shock is smallest for the
wealthy and for a high degree of unhealthiness of the consumption good. The
predictions regarding health and age are ambiguous.
2.4 Towards an empirical specification
The first-order conditions for healthy consumption (7) and unhealthy consumption (10)
guide our empirical analysis. The first-order condition for unhealthy consumption can be
approximated as
∂U
∂Cu
≈ qA(0)piI(t) ∂d
∂Cu
H(t)e(β−δ)t, (14)
if the monetary price is small compared to the health cost of unhealthy consumption,
an argument made by Cutler and Lleras-Muney (2010). Under invertibility of the utility
12The marginal cost of health investment equals the ratio of the marginal value of wealth to the marginal
value of health piI(t) = qA(t)/qH(t), and is increasing in wealth and decreasing in health under the common
assumption of decreasing returns to wealth ∂qA(t)
∂A(t)
< 0 and to health ∂qH (t)
∂H(t)
< 0. Endogenous longevity
complicates matters. While better health may reduce the demand for investment, at the same time
better health enables life extension which may increase the return on, and therefore demand for, health
investment.
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function, this could be approximated and linearized by
lnCu = φ1 ln qA(0) + φ2 lnpiI(t) + φ3 ln
∂d
∂Cu
+ φ4 lnH(t) + φ5(β − δ)t. (15)
The coefficients φ can be interpreted as (combinations of) the structural parameters of
the model, but these are not our main interest in this study. Their estimation would
require functional form assumptions, and our aim here is primarily to test the theoretical
predictions. While we do not have direct measurements of all variables on the RHS of
equation (15), we approximate ln qA(0), lnpiI(t) and lnH(t) by including controls for
life-time full wealth (as a measure of the marginal value of initial wealth qA(0)),
13 health
status, and education (as an efficiency factor in the production of health). We approximate
the derivative of the deterioration rate with respect to (un)healthy consumption ∂d∂Cu
with demographics such as age, sex, and environmental factors. Finally, to account for
differences in the price of unhealthy consumption goods and medical services, and for
region-specific policies affecting the outcomes, we include region-wave interactions.
Hence, the empirical equation to be estimated is of the form
lnCi,t = α+ β1 lnWi + β2 lnHi,t−1 + β3 lnEi + γZi,t−1 + (τt × θr) + εi,t, (16)
where i denotes the individual and t the wave, Ci,t is the consumption outcome, Wi is
(initial) life-time full wealth (it can also be viewed as permanent income, which is the
flow yield on the perpetuity equivalent in value to life-time full wealth; see, e.g., Heckman
1976), Hi,t−1 is lagged health status, Ei is education (assumed to be constant over time),
Zi,t−1 covers demographic and environmental factors, τt are wave dummies, θr are regional
dummies, and εi,t is an error term.
Life-time full wealth Wi is unobserved, and difficult to construct from a limited number
of repeated observations for a given individual. We include individual fixed effects αi to
account for this permanent component of wealth, and exploit exogenous variation in wealth
to test how variation in (life-time) wealth affects consumption decisions.
3 Data and Methodology
We exploit two sources of plausibly exogenous variation in wealth: lottery winnings and
inheritances.14 We extract lottery winnings from the British Household Panel Survey
13The marginal value of initial wealth qA(0) =
∂
∂A(0)
∫ T
0
U(∗)e−βtdt, where U(∗) is the maximized utility
function (see, e.g., Caputo, 2005). It is a function of life-time full wealth, which depends on initial wealth
A(0), life-time earnings, preferences, etc. and operates like permanent income in the theory of consumption
(see, e.g., Heckman, 1976).
14We have also experimented with exploiting state-level variation in house prices as an instrument for
individual housing wealth gains, but we could not reject a positive effect of housing wealth on the aggregate
consumption of renters, casting doubts about the exogeneity of house price increases (see also Ratcliffe
2012). We also experimented with variations in stock market wealth, relying on changes in the Standard
& Poors Index as in Schwandt (2011). However, our analyses could not establish an effect of increases in
stock market wealth on aggregate consumption, casting doubt on its usefulness as an instrument.
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(BHPS) and inheritance receipt from the US Health and Retirement Study (HRS). We
discuss the data sources and empirical strategies below.
3.1 British Household Panel Survey (BHPS)
3.1.1 Data and descriptive statistics
The BHPS is a multi-purpose panel survey among households in Great-Britain covering
all individuals aged 15 and above in the household. The panel runs since 1991, and in 1999
samples from Scotland and Wales were added. The BHPS provides information on a wide
variety of demographic, socioeconomic and health outcomes for around 15,000 individuals
each year.15 We use waves 7 to 18 corresponding to the years 1997 to 2008, as relevant
information on lottery winnings is not available before 1997. The total sample size is
165,488 person-year observations for 26,462 distinct individuals. Table C.1 in appendix
C lists all variables and their units of analysis employed in this work. We discuss the
dependent and independent variables in more detail below.
Dependent variables: Our first dependent variable is Food Expenditures,16 “How
much do you personally spend in an average month on eating out at, or buying takeaway
food from, a restaurant, pub or cafe, including school meals or meals at work?”, which is
not interpreted as either healthy or unhealthy but serves to verify if wealth shocks have
any effect on consumption. Our measures of unhealthy consumption are Smoking, “Do
you smoke cigarettes?”; Number of Cigarettes, “Approximately how many cigarettes a
day do you usually smoke, including those you roll yourself?”; and Drinking Out, “How
often do you go out for a drink at a pub or club?” in five categories.17 Our measure for
healthy consumption is Sports, “How often do you play sport/go walking/swimming?” in
the same five categories as for drinking. The Drinking Out and Sports variables are only
available every other year. All monetary values are measured in natural logarithms,18 and
converted to year 2005 British pounds using the Consumer Price Index (CPI).19,20
Independent variables: Accurate wealth information is only available in 2000 and
2005. We follow Banks et al. (2003) and compute Household Wealth by adding the
net value of vehicles, savings accounts, investments, home and all other property, and
15For more information on the BHPS see http://www.iser.essex.ac.uk/ulsc/bhps
16Food Expenditures are only available in brackets – see Table C.1. We assign the midpoint of the
relevant bracket, and for the highest bracket, which has no upper bound, we assign the lower bound.
17The categories are: “At least once a week”, “At least once a month”, “Several times a year”, “Once
a year or less”, and “Never/almost never”. We transformed the variables Drinking Out and Sports such
that 1 represents “Never/almost never” and 5 represents “At least once a week”.
18For household income and wealth, both variables to be defined below, we add 1 in order to keep
observations where individuals report having zero income or wealth in our sample.
19http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/taxonomy/index.html?nscl=Economy
20In the final year of the panel, 2008, the fraction reporting that they never engage in sports increased
substantially. In a personal communication with the UK Data Archive officials acknowledged the surprising
increase but could not find a satisfactory explanation. We therefore exclude the Sports variable of the last
wave from our analysis.
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subtracting the total of mortgages and other debts.21 Lottery Winnings are based on the
answer to the question “Have you personally received any payments, or payment in kind,
from a win on the football pools, national lottery or other form of gambling since previous
year?”. If answered positively, the answer to the next question “About how much in total
did you receive (was this worth)?” defines Amount Lottery Won in British pounds. Big
Win is defined as amounts won of 500 British pounds or more.
Control variables: Household Income, Age, Sex, Region, Household Size, Number
of Children, Level of Education, Health Status, Marital Status and Employment Status
are used as control variables and are defined in Table C.1. Table 1 provides descriptive
statistics by lottery winning status. Lottery winners are significantly different in many
characteristics from non-winners. They are slightly younger, more often male, married and
college educated, but with fewer children, and located in different regions of the United
Kingdom (they are more likely to live in the North, South and East and less likely to
live in Wales and Northern-Ireland). In line with the findings by Imbens et al. (2001)
among a sample of lottery winners in Massachusetts and Apouey and Clark (2010) using
the BHPS, but in contrast to a US survey by Clotfelter and Cook (1989), lottery winners
have slightly higher household income and wealth, and are more often employed.
3.1.2 BHPS Methodology
Even though winning the lottery likely represents an unanticipated shock to wealth
(Imbens et al. 2001; Gardner and Oswald 2007; Apouey and Clark 2010), it is not
randomly distributed across the population – not everyone plays the lottery, and lottery
winners differ in various characteristics from non-winners (see Table 1). Moreover, the
group of non-winners includes individuals that did not play the lottery, and individuals
that did play but did not win. These too may be very different groups. A limitation of
the BHPS is that we cannot distinguish between non-winners who played and non-players.
For these reasons, using a simple regression of the dependent variable on an indicator
of winning the lottery, we cannot estimate the causal effect of winning the lottery on
the outcome. Including a battery of control variables may improve the inference, but is
unlikely to fully overcome the endogeneity of lottery winnings. We use three different
strategies to overcome the endogeneity issue.
First specification: FE Lottery Won Our first approach is to include an
individual-specific fixed effect to account for the fact that lottery winners are intrinsically
different from non-winners. The fixed effect controls for all time-invariant personal
characteristics likely to influence both lottery play and health behaviors, such as life-time
full wealth (or permanent income), education, risk aversion, cognitive and non-cognitive
abilities, and time preference. A parsimonious version of equation (16), including an
individual specific fixed effect, can be written as
lnCi,t = αi + βIi,t + γ
′Xi,t−1 + (τt × θr) + εi,t, (17)
21These wealth and debt measures are available in unfolding brackets. We assign the midpoint of the
relevant bracket, and for the highest bracket, which has no upper bound, we assign the lower bound.
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where Ci,t is the outcome measure for individual i at time t, αi represents the
individual-specific fixed effect, Ii,t is a binary indicator of whether one won the lottery
or not, Xi,t−1 is a matrix of plausibly exogenous control variables including lagged health,
and (τt × θr) are the interactions between time dummies and region dummies capturing
regional differences over time regarding the business cycle, inflation, monetary prices,
excise taxes, and other changes affecting the outcome and lottery play that differ between
regions over time.
Second specification: FE Big Lottery Won Our second approach is based on
Imbens et al. (2001) and distinguishes between “small” and “big” lottery winnings.
This offers two advantages over the first specification. First, below a certain threshold,
lottery winnings are unlikely to influence behavior and including them will attenuate the
coefficient estimates. Second, since individuals who win small amounts plausibly share
characteristics with individuals who win big amounts, they can act as a natural control
group for the big winners. This approach involves two fundamental assumptions: (1)
conditional on winning the lottery, the amount won is unrelated to personal characteristics,
and (2) small lottery winnings are too small to materially affect wealth and consumption
behavior. Under these two assumptions, and controlling for small lottery winnings, big
lottery winnings represent the effect of a wealth shock. The drawback of this approach is
that one needs to determine a threshold above which lottery winnings are considered big,
which is essentially arbitrary.
In order to make this process least arbitrary we tested these two assumptions for
different threshold levels. On the basis of these analyses,22 thresholds at 250, 500, and
1,000 British pounds were deemed most appropriate. Using these thresholds, statistically
significant differences between small and big winners are fewest, and winning a big amount
has a statistically significant effect on both wealth23 and food expenditures. Table 1
presents the differences in the covariates’ means across small and big lottery winners.
For reasons of space we only present the results for the threshold at 500 British pounds
(results are very similar for the 250 and 1,000 British pounds thresholds). Although
22We placed the threshold at the median win of 32, and at 50, 100, 250, 500, 1,000, 5,000, and 10,000
British pounds, and, following Imbens et al. (2001), performed t-tests on the difference in the means of
independent and control variables across small and big lottery winners for all threshold levels. In case
the amount won is random, one would expect no differences in observable characteristics across small
and big lottery winners. If the t-tests cannot reject that the means of the observable characteristics are
similar, this is taken as evidence that winning a big or small amount is essentially random. We further
investigated the coefficients of big lottery winnings (as defined by the different thresholds) on the log
of 2000 and 2005 household wealth and food expenditures, to test whether big lottery winnings had an
additional effect – over and above small winnings – on wealth and on food expenditures (as a proxy for
aggregate consumption). Although these tests do not validate the assumption that small winnings do not
materially affect wealth and consumption behavior, they do confirm that big lottery winners respond more
to a lottery win than do small lottery winners. Results of these analyses are available upon request.
23We cannot use the impact of lottery winnings on wealth as a viable first stage in an Instrumental
Variables (IV) strategy. Since part of the money won in the lottery will be spent on consumption, it will
not be included in reported wealth in the survey. This would lead to underestimating the effect of the
lottery win on wealth, and hence overestimating any impact of wealth on the consumption outcomes.
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differences in average characteristics between small and big winners are smaller than
between non-winners and lottery winners (see also Table 1), important differences remain,
e.g., males are overrepresented in the “Big Win” group, and this group is less educated,
less often married, and more often self-employed. Plausibly this residual heterogeneity
stems from the fact that we do not observe the number of lottery tickets bought, which
could be related to individual characteristics such as sex and income. To account for this
residual heterogeneity within the group of lottery winners, we add an individual-specific
fixed effect. The corresponding equation, our second specification to be estimated, can be
summarized as
lnCi,t = αi + β1Ii,t + β2I [Ai,t > c] + γ
′Xi,t−1 + (τt × θr) + εi,t, (18)
where Ai,t denotes the amount won, c represents the threshold for big lottery winnings,
here taken as 500 British pounds, I [·] is the indicator function (1 when true, 0 if false),
and β2 measures the effect of a wealth shock (big lottery win) on the relevant outcome.
Third specification: FE Log Amount Lottery Won A related, and final,
approach is to substitute the logarithm of the amount won Ai,t directly in the specification.
The notion is that larger winnings represent larger increases in wealth and may affect the
outcomes stronger. The approach is again based on the assumption that conditional on
winning the lottery, whether you win a big or small amount is random. An advantage of
this approach is that it does not require setting an arbitrary threshold. This approach
is implemented by Apouey and Clark (2010) by restricting to lottery winners but not
including individual fixed effects. As argued before, since we do not observe the number
of lottery tickets bought, those who won large amounts could be intrinsically different
from those who won small amounts. Therefore, we extend the specification of Apouey
and Clark (2010) by including individual-specific fixed effects, which defines our third
specification:
lnCi,t = αi + β lnAi,t + γ
′Xi,t−1 + (τt × θr) + εi,t. (19)
3.2 Health and Retirement Study (HRS)
3.2.1 Data and descriptive statistics
To exploit exogenous variation in wealth deriving from inheritances we use the US Health
and Retirement Study (HRS) for the years 1992-2010. For most of the variables we use
the RAND version of the HRS, which is a user-friendly, harmonized version of the data.
The information regarding inheritance receipt and expectations, the number of cigarettes
smoked per day, and food expenditures are taken from the original HRS files. The initial
HRS cohort consists of around 13,500 individuals born between 1931 and 1941. It has been
appended by additional cohorts of different birth years. The total sample size consists
of 153,024 person-year observations for 27,900 distinct individuals. Table C.2 lists all
variables and their units of analysis. We discuss the dependent and independent variables
in more detail below.
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Dependent variables: Our first dependent variable in the HRS is Food
Expenditures,24 which again is not interpreted as either healthy or unhealthy but
serves to verify if wealth shocks have an effect on overall consumption. Measures
of unhealthy consumption are Smoking, “Do you smoke cigarettes now?”; Number of
Cigarettes,25“About how many cigarettes or packs do you usually smoke in a day now?”;
Drinking, “Do you ever drink any alcoholic beverages, such as beer, wine, or liquor?”;
Number of Drinks, which is the product of the answers to the questions “In the last three
months, on average, how many days per week have you had any alcohol to drink?” and “In
the last three months, on the days you drink, about how many drinks do you have?” (this
definition is also used by Kim and Ruhm 2012); and Heavy Drinking, a binary indicator
of whether the individual drinks 3 or more glasses on an occasion when drinking (this
definition is also used by, e.g., Cutler and Glaeser 2005; Arcidiacono et al. 2007). Our
measure of healthy consumption is Light Physical Activity, “How often do you take part in
sports or activities that are mildly energetic, such as vacuuming, laundry, home repairs?”,
measured in five categories; and a measure of health investment is Out-of-Pocket Medical
Expenditures, a self-reported estimate of expenditures since the previous interview on four
groups of services: hospital/nursing, doctor/outpatient/dental, prescription drugs, and
home health care/special facilities.
For both the number of cigarettes smoked per day and for out-of-pocket medical
expenditures, the question wording changed considerably from wave 1994 to 1996.
Therefore, in the analyses of cigarettes per day and out-of-pocket medical expenditures
we restrict our analysis to wave 1996 and beyond. Frequency of drinking is only available
from 1996 on, and food expenditures are only available from 2000 on. Light physical
activity is used since 2004 due to a major change in the question wording. All monetary
values are measured in natural logarithms,26 and converted to 2005 US dollars using the
Consumer Price Index (CPI).27
Independent variables: Household Wealth is defined as the sum of all wealth
components less all debt.28 Information on Inheritance receipt is obtained from the
question “In the past two years, have you (or your partner) received money or property in
24Food Expenditures are the sum of the answers to three questions pertaining to food expenses: (1)
“About how much do you (and other family members living there) spend on food that you use at home
in an average week?”, (2) “About how much do you spend in an average week on food delivered to the
door?”, and (3) “About how much do you spend eating out in a typical week, not counting meals at work
or at school?”
25The number of cigarettes per day is recorded in either single cigarettes or packs. We assumed that a
pack consists of 20 cigarettes to convert packs into cigarettes.
26For out-of-pocket medical expenditures, food expenditures, household income and household wealth
we add 1 in order to keep observations where respondents report zero value.
27http://www.bls.gov/cpi/
28Wealth components include the net values of (i) primary residence, (ii) real estate other than primary
residence, (iii) vehicles, (iv) businesses, (v) Individual Retirement Accounts (IRAs) and Keogh accounts,
(vi) stocks, mutual funds, and investment trusts, (vii) Certificate of Deposits (CDs), government savings
bonds, and T-bills, (viii) bonds and bond funds, and (ix) all other savings. Debt components include the
net value of (i) all mortgages on the primary residence, (ii) other home loans, and (iii) all other debt.
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the form of an inheritance, a trust fund, or an insurance settlement?”, where we disregard
trust funds and insurance settlements. If answered affirmative, the respondents are asked
“About how much did you receive from the inheritance?”. The answer to this question
defines Amount Inherited. Individuals not providing exact amounts were requested to
answer whether the value was less than, about, or more than 50,000 US dollars, which
we converted to 17,276, 50,000, and 186,509 US dollars, respectively, given the sample
averages in those categories (taken from Kim and Ruhm 2012). Big Inheritance is defined
as amounts received of 10,000 US dollars or more. We drop individuals who report having
received an inheritance before the first wave (1992), as we don’t know the exact timing of
the receipt, and this could bias the estimates.
Control variables: Household Income, Age, Sex, Race, Census Region, Household
Size, Number of Children, Years of Education, Health Status, Marital Status, Employment
Status, Ever Smoked, and Health Insurance are used as control variables and are defined
in Table C.2. Additionally we include controls for whether Mother Died, Father Died,
Mother in Law Died, or Father in Law Died, and whether the individual got Widowed.
Table 2 presents the averages of the control variables by inheritance receipt status.
Inheritance recipients are statistically significantly different in nearly every single domain
from non-recipients. White, wealthy, working, higher educated, and high income
individuals are more likely to receive an inheritance. Further, inheritance recipients are
slightly younger, more often married, and have fewer children. As one would expect,
the fraction for which a parent or parent in law died is considerably higher in the
inheritance recipients group. When comparing small with big inheritance recipients,
differences become smaller, but are still substantial and statistically significant in many
cases. Apart from being slightly older, big inheritance recipients are in better health, are
higher educated, earn more income and have substantially more wealth.
3.2.2 HRS Methodology
The empirical strategy exploiting inheritances is almost identical to the one for lottery
winnings. Our Fourth specification: FE Inheritance is a fixed effects estimation
replacing lottery winnings by inheritance receipt in equation (17) (section 3.1.2). Our
Fifth specification: FE Big Win is the equivalent of equation (18) in section 3.1.2
using a cut-off of 10,000 US dollars following Kim and Ruhm (2012), and our Sixth
specification: FE Log Amount Inherited consists of replacing the amount won in
the lottery by the amount received through an inheritance in equation (19) (section 3.1.2).
The receipt of an inheritance has been shown to represent useful and important
variation in wealth (see Meer et al. 2003; Michaud and Van Soest 2008; Kim and
Ruhm 2012), although questions have been raised regarding its exogeneity and whether
inheritances are unanticipated. We seek to address the potential endogeneity of the receipt
and size of an inheritance by including individual fixed effects and control variables
in our specifications. To gauge the severity of the anticipation effect, we followed
Goodstein (2008) and experimented with controlling for the lagged subjective probability
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of receiving an inheritance, obtained from information in the HRS on expectations about
inheritances available in waves 1994 to 2006.29 The results were very similar to our baseline
specifications (and are available upon request). Further, anticipation of inheritances would
only lead to underestimating any wealth effect on consumption, inheritance expectations
are available only for the period 1994 to 2006, and are subject to large item non-response.
For these reasons, we do not use expectation information in our baseline specifications.
Finally, the receipt of an inheritance may be associated with a bereavement effect due to
the loss of a beloved one that may independently affect health behavior. We therefore
control for the death of family members in our specifications (Brown et al. 2010).30
4 Results
In section 4.1 we present results for the BHPS and in section 4.2 for the HRS.
4.1 The effect of lottery winnings
We estimate the three fixed effects specifications (17), (18) and (19) for the full BHPS
sample to verify theoretical prediction 1 of section 2.3, and estimate the same regressions
for subgroups defined by (i) an imputed wealth measure and health status, and (ii) age,
to verify theoretical prediction 2 of section 2.3.
The analyses include the following control variables: the first lag of log household
income, age, age-squared,31 first lag of region dummies (19 regions), first lag of household
size, first lag of the number of children, first lag of health status (five categories), first
lag of marital status (seven categories), first lag of employment status (ten categories),
and interactions between time dummies and region dummies capturing regional differences
over time.
We estimate the impact of lottery winnings on smoking separately for those who
smoked in the previous wave and for those who did not, as the decision to quit or
initiate smoking are very different (e.g., Gilman et al. 2003). For the number of cigarettes
consumed, we restrict the analyses to those who smoked in the last wave. In all models
we use robust standard errors clustered at the individual level.
Full sample Lottery winnings are fairly common, ranging from 7 to 19 percent of
the sample in each year. Over the course of the panel 7,113, or 27 percent, out of a total
of 26,462 distinct individuals won the lottery at least once. The first column of Table 3
provides descriptive statistics of the sample. The average of the log amount corresponds
29We include a dummy in the regressions for observations where subjective probabilities of receiving an
inheritance are missing.
3047.68 percent of inheritances comes from parents, 22.17 percent from parents in law, 2.31 percent from
siblings, 21.98 percent from other relatives (grandparents, aunts/uncles), 1.55 percent from (ex-)spouse,
and 4.31 percent from other sources.
31All results are robust to including a quartic polynomial in age to allow for a more flexible relationship
between the outcomes and age.
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to around 40 British pounds,32 which is less than one percent of total household wealth.
Between 3 and 8 percent of lottery winners in any year win an amount over 500 British
pounds. The average of the log amount won in this group corresponds to 1,500 British
pounds, representing two percent of household wealth and six percent of annual household
income.
Table 4 presents the results of estimating the models FE Lottery Won (17), FE Big
Lottery Win (18), and FE Log Amount Won (19). Panel 1 shows a positive effect of
lottery winnings on food expenditures that is statistically significant in two out of three
models. The lack of an effect in the first specification (FE Lottery Won) may be due to
the fact that many lottery winnings are not large enough to affect consumption decisions,
and their inclusion attenuates the estimate. For this reason our preferred specifications
are FE Big Lottery Won and FE Log Amount Won. The size of the coefficient in the
FE Big Lottery Won specification is 0.096, suggesting that food expenditures increase by
around ten percent following a big lottery win. The baseline amount spent on eating out
is around 25 British pounds (exp(3.20); see Table 3), suggesting that individuals spend
2.5 British pounds more per month on eating out after a win of 1,500 British pounds, on
average.33 The effect on food expenditures builds confidence that (big) lottery winnings
represent unanticipated and important variation in wealth.
The top panel of Table 4 shows no effect on either smoking34 or, conditional on smoking
in the previous wave, the number of cigarettes smoked. Using the FE Big Lottery Won
specification, we can rule out prevalence changes larger than 1.4 percentage points (or
5.2 percent [at the 5 percent level]), and prevalence changes in the number of cigarettes
smoked larger than 16.8 percent (or more than 1.8 cigarettes [at the 5 percent level]; see
also Table 3). This is in contrast to the results presented by Apouey and Clark (2010),
which we replicated (see Table C.3 in the appendix). By including individual fixed effects
we control for time-invariant unobserved differential characteristics that render the effect
of winning the lottery on smoking and the number of cigarettes insignificant. This suggests
that the OLS results presented by Apouey and Clark (2010) may not be reflecting a causal
impact of wealth on the outcomes, but be due to differential characteristics of those that
win larger amounts compared to those that win smaller amounts. The difference in results
could also reflect larger standard errors in our fixed effects specification, but comparing
Table C.3 and Table 4 suggests it is rather smaller point estimates than smaller standard
errors that induce the loss of significance.
32We compute the average amount won as the exponent of the mean log amount won, since the log
amount is used in our empirical specifications, and the distribution of lottery winnings is heavily skewed,
with very large amounts increasing the raw average substantially. For comparison, the average amount
won is about 250 and the median amount is 32 British pounds.
33It is not straightforward to arrive at a comparable interpretation for the FE Log Amount Lottery Won
specification, where we have ∂y
y
= β ∂x
x
but no good measures of x. For this reason we focus on the FE
Big Lottery Won specification to quantify effect sizes.
34A positive (negative) coefficient of a lottery win on the prevalence of smoking, conditional on smoking
in the previous wave, implies that lottery winners are more (less) likely to continue smoking than those
not winning the lottery, conditional on smoking in the previous wave.
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We find strong and robust evidence that lottery winnings increase the frequency of
drinking out in a pub or club. The effect is statistically significant in all models estimated.
To get an idea of the size of this effect, we used the probability of drinking out at least
once a month as dependent variable in our three specifications (not shown). In our FE
Big Lottery Won specification the coefficient is 0.0466 and is statistically significant at
the five percent level. Hence, upon winning an amount of 1,500 British Pounds in the
lottery, the probability of drinking out at least once a month increases by around five
percentage points, or ten percent given a baseline prevalence of around 50 percent. The
frequency of engaging in sports shows a positive response to lottery winnings in two out
of three models, but the effect size is rather small. Again, to get an idea of the size of this
effect, we used the probability of engaging in sports at least once a month in our three
specifications (also not shown). Winning the lottery increases the probability of engaging
in sports at least once a month by 1.76 percentage points, or 2.60 percent.
Subgroup analyses We analyze the responses in four subgroups: (a) most healthy
most wealthy, (b) most healthy least wealthy, (c) least healthy most wealthy and (d) least
healthy least wealthy.
According to our theory, responses to a change in wealth are a function of life-time
full wealth Wi (see equation 16). Ideally we would like to split the sample on the basis of
this measure. Unfortunately, life-time full wealth is difficult to construct since household
wealth is only available in two waves and even then it is often missing. For this reason
we determine the age-wave specific median level of wealth, obtained from an imputed
measure of household wealth, to divide the sample into wealth subgroups. We obtain
Imputed Household Wealth as follows. In the years 2000 and 2005, where we observe
actual household wealth, we regress it on the set of control variables from Table C.1,
particularly household income, health, age, age-squared, and the level of education. We
use this model to predict household wealth for all individuals and years.35
Ideally we would also like to use the age-wave specific median (or average) health to
divide the sample by health status, but since the self-reported health measure is only
available in five categories, this is not feasible. We therefore simply split the sample
according to whether one’s initial health (at panel entrance) is “Excellent” or “Good”
on the one hand, or “Fair”, “Poor” or “Very Poor” on the other. Then, within those
subsamples we stratify according to whether the initial imputed wealth (at panel entrance)
is above or below the age-wave-specific median imputed wealth.36 We use imputed wealth
and self-reported health at first observation since these measures are not contaminated by
possible lottery winnings during our observation period.
The top half of Table 3 shows that a lottery win represents less than one percent of
total household wealth for all subgroups. In contrast, a “Big Win” of over 500 British
35Our imputed measure of wealth behaves nicely, gradually increasing over the years of the panel, and we
believe it contains substantially more information than simply using education as an indicator of lifetime
wealth. As a robustness check we also used educational attainment as a measure of full wealth to stratify
the sample. Results were very similar, cf. the robustness checks in section 4.3.
36We use 5-year age brackets from 15-19, 20-24, . . . 75-79, and 80 and higher, to avoid small cell sizes.
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pounds represents, respectively, 5 and 28 percent of household wealth, for the most healthy
least wealthy and the least healthy most wealthy. For wealthier individuals the wealth
shock is around one percent of household wealth.
Panels two to five of Table 4 show how the different groups respond to exogenous
variation in wealth in the form of lottery wins. The results suggest that larger lottery
winnings (wins of over 500 British pounds [FE Big Lottery Won], or a larger monetary
amount [FE Log Amount Lottery Won]) increase food expenditures in all groups, although
point estimates are not always statistically significant. Consistent with the results for the
full sample, for none of the wealth-health subgroups we observe an effect on smoking or
on the number of cigarettes consumed. The point estimates for drinking out are positive
in all subgroups, although they are not always statistically significant.
We also stratify the sample by age, defining two groups: (i) those who are still below
age 50 in the last wave of the panel (year 2008), and (ii) those who are above age 50 in
2008.For both age groups a “Big Win” represents about 2 percent of household wealth
(see Table 3). Panels six and seven of Table 4 present the results for the effect of lottery
wins by age groups. Both younger and older individuals show some response in food
expenditures. Consistent with the results from the full sample, none of the two subgroups
respond to a lottery win by changes in the prevalence of smoking or, when smoking, in
the number of cigarettes smoked. The effects on drinking out and sports are larger and
more pronounced among the elderly.
4.2 The effect of inheritances
We first estimate the three specifications (17), (18), and (19) for the full HRS sample to
verify theoretical prediction 1 of section 2.3 using inheritances. Then we estimate the three
specifications for subgroups defined by wealth and health to verify theoretical prediction
2 of section 2.3. Because the age range is much smaller in the HRS than in the BHPS
we do not investigate subgroups by age. We estimate the impact of inheritance receipt
on smoking separately for those who smoked in the previous wave and those who did not
smoke. For cigarette consumption, we restrict to those that smoked in the last wave, and
we restrict to those that drank in the previous wave to estimate the effect on the number
of drinks and the indicator for heavy drinking. In all models we use robust standard
errors clustered at the household level, as the sample includes both respondents and their
spouses.
The analyses include the following control variables: the first lag of log household
wealth, the first lag of log household income, age, age-squared, first lag of census region
dummies (five regions), first lag of household size, first lag of number of children, first lag
of health status (five categories), first lag of marital status (eight categories), first lag of
employment status (binary), first lag of health insurance, whether mother, father, mother
in law or father in law died since the last wave, whether became widowed since last wave,
and interactions between time dummies and region dummies capturing regional differences
over time.
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Full sample Between 2.7 and 6.9 percent of the sample received an inheritance
over the waves. Table 3 shows that in contrast to lottery winnings, the mean of the log of
inheritance is substantial: corresponding to around 40,000 US dollars,37 or 12 percent of
current wealth. Around 80 percent of all inheritances can be considered “big”: between
1.9 and 5.9 percent of the sample received an inheritance of more than 10,000 US dollars
over the waves.
Panel 1 of Table 5 presents the results of estimating models FE Inheritance (17), FE
Big Inheritance (18), and FE Log Amount Inherited (19) using inheritance receipts rather
than lottery winnings, and using the HRS rather than the BHPS. The first line presents
evidence that the receipt of an inheritance increases food expenditures. Individuals spend
on average about 100 US dollars on food per week (exp(4.64); see Table 3), and the
receipt of an inheritance increases this by 4.9 percent (see under FE Inheritance in Panel
1 of Table 5), suggesting that receipt on an inheritance of 40,000 US dollars on average
increases food expenditures per week by around 5 US dollars (or about 260 US dollars per
year).
Yet, using the FE Big Inheritance specification as in Kim and Ruhm (2012)38 we
find no evidence of an increase in food expenditures. This may be because the working
hypothesis that inheritances under 10,000 US dollars are small enough not to impact
behavior is invalid, and this would lead to underestimation of effect sizes. There appears
to be some evidence of this as fewer statistically significant effects are found for the FE
Big Inheritance specification as for the other two, with the exception of a significant
decrease in light physical activity. Moving the cut-off down decreases the number of small
inheritances drastically, and point estimates and their statistical significance are sensitive
to the chosen cut-off (results are available upon request). In short, we find this specification
problematic in the case of inheritances and do not further employ it in the subsequent
subgroup analyses.
A sudden wealth increase in the form of an inheritance receipt increases the prevalence
of smoking by around one percentage point (see under FE Inheritance in Panel 1 of
Table 5), or 6.0 percent (see Table 3).39 Although not statistically significant, the point
estimates are larger for those who previously smoked, suggesting that what drives the
effect on smoking prevalence is smokers not quitting rather than non-smokers initiating.
37We compute the average as the exponent of the mean log amount received as the log amount is used in
the empirical specifications, and the distribution of inheritances is heavily skewed. The mean inheritance
is over 300,000 US dollars, and the median is around 37,000 US dollars.
38Kim and Ruhm (2012) define “Big Inheritance” as an indicator whether the cumulative amount
received by the current survey wave is greater than 10,000 US dollars. Using cumulative amounts seems
appropriate for an outcome such as health, the focus of their paper, for which wealth changes are likely
to have a delayed affect. We focus on instantaneous responses to inheritance receipt, which seems more
appropriate for our consumption outcomes. Additionally, using our specification we can identify the exact
timing of the impact, whereas employing cumulative amounts treats inheritances received 18 years ago
and inheritances received this year in the same way.
39As before, it is not as straightforward to arrive at a comparable interpretation for the FE Log Amount
Inherited specification, where we have ∂y
y
= β ∂x
x
but no good measures of x. For this reason we focus on
the FE Inheritance specification to quantify effect sizes.
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On the intensive margin, smokers increase the number of cigarettes they smoke per day
by around ten percent on average. A sample average of 8.8 (exp(2.18)) cigarettes per
day among smokers suggests that inheritance recipients receiving an amount of 40,000 US
dollars, or 12 percent of household wealth, on average, smoke about 0.9 cigarettes more
per day.
The prevalence of drinking also increases following the receipt of an inheritance by
1.37 percentage points, or 2.76 percent. There is no evidence of a change in the number of
drinks consumed per week or in the prevalence of heavy drinking. Light physical activity
and out-of-pocket expenditures on medical care are not affected by the receipt of an
inheritance (although there is weak evidence that out-of-pocket expenditures on medical
care increase with the size of the inheritance).
Our findings challenge those of Kim and Ruhm (2012) who reported an effect of a big
inheritance receipt on both the prevalence and intensity of drinking, but not on smoking
or on the number of cigarettes smoked. This suggests that the findings of Kim and Ruhm
(2012) may be driven by unobserved heterogeneity across inheritance recipients below and
above the threshold of 10,000 US dollars they employed.
Subgroup analyses In the subgroup analyses, we stratify the sample by initial
wealth and initial self-reported health similar to lottery winners (panels two to five of
Table 5). We define four groups of roughly similar size. We first divide the sample
on the basis of initial self-reported health, where “Excellent” and “Very Good” health
form the “Most Healthy” group, and “Good”, “Fair” or “Poor” health form the “Least
Healthy” group. Then within those groups we stratify by wealth, where the “Most
Wealthy” group is defined as individuals whose wealth at first observation is greater than
the age-wave-specific median wealth.40 The remainder constitutes the “Least Wealthy”
group. The bottom half of Table 3 shows that for all subgroups an inheritance represents
a substantial wealth shock. For the most healthy most wealthy, an inheritance represents
eight percent of household wealth on average, and this increases to 40 percent for the least
healthy least wealthy.
Table 5 shows the effect of inheritance receipt among the same four subgroups. The
most striking observation is that virtually all results seem to be driven by the healthier
part of the population (panels 2 and 3). An exception is light physical activity where the
most healthy and most wealthy (panel 2) decrease and the least healthy and most wealthy
(panel 4) increase their activity. The fact that virtually no response is seen among the
least healthy shows that, even though the relative size of the wealth shock is larger among
the least healthy, the most healthy respond more to a change in wealth. This suggests
that the direct wealth effect alone cannot explain the observed behavioral responses, and
that health costs are important and larger for unhealthy individuals.
Within the healthy group of individuals, the prevalence of smoking and drinking
increases upon receipt of an inheritance, with larger effect sizes for the least wealthy
compared to the most wealthy: the most healthy most wealthy increase smoking by
40We use five-year age brackets: below 50, 50-54, . . ., 80-84, and above 85.
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around 1.1 percentage point (or 10 percent) and drinking by 1.8 percentage points (or
2.7 percent), while the most healthy least wealthy increase their prevalence of smoking
by 2.3 percentage points (or 13 percent) and drinking by 2.9 percentage points (or 5.6
percent).
Interestingly, for the most healthy and least wealthy a positive effect is found in the
number of cigarettes consumed but not for other subgroups. This finding is in line with
the theoretical prediction (cf. prediction 2 in section 2.3) that the response to a wealth
shock is stronger for individuals with low health costs, i.e. for the least wealthy. Given
the average number of cigarettes smoked per day in this group is 8.9 (exp(2.19)), the point
estimate suggests an increase of 24.3 percent, or around 2.2 cigarettes per day.
4.3 Robustness Checks
In performing the analyses we ran a battery of robustness checks, results of which are
available upon request. First, we investigated differential responses by gender, and while
the effects on females are typically slightly larger than for males, we couldn’t reject the null
hypothesis that effects are similar across genders. We therefore only present results for
the full sample. Second, while the three models (17), (18) and (19) are specified in linear
form, we also estimated logit models for the binary indicators, and negative-binomial count
models for the variables concerning the number of cigarettes and the number of drinks.
The results were very similar.
We experimented with using lottery winnings and inheritances one period lagged to
allow for some time delay in the response. This exercise produced similar results for lottery
winnings in the BHPS, while the point estimates using inheritances in the HRS were much
smaller and mostly insignificant. This suggests that the largest effect of inheritances in
the elderly HRS population is immediate, and that most of the windfall gains are spend
quickly. This interpretation is corroborated by the fact that two waves after the receipt of
an inheritance the wealth of inheritance recipients is barely higher than for non-inheritance
recipients. Further, there are no significant differences in food expenditures between
recipients and non-recipients one wave after receipt of an inheritance.
Relative rather than absolute changes in wealth may matter in consumption decisions.
We experimented with replacing the logarithm of the amount won or inheritance received
Ai,t by the logarithm of the ratio of the amount won or received over total current
household income (BHPS) or total current household wealth (HRS). Results were very
similar.
We have used a static selection procedure to define subgroups by initial health and
initial wealth. This has the advantage that the individuals selected into one of the four
subgroups remain in that subgroup over the course of the panel study. Alternatively,
one might consider a dynamic selection procedure in which one stratifies individuals
dynamically on the basis of the previous’ wave wealth and health. This has the advantage
that the information is more up-to-date, but we no longer follow the same subgroup of
individuals. We also used this dynamic selection procedure and found that differences
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were minimal.
In addition, we replaced our imputed wealth measure by education for the purpose
of defining subgroups of lifetime full wealth, distinguishing in the BHPS between three
education levels on the basis of the OECD International Classification (ISCED – OECD
1996). “Lower Educated” are those with less than secondary school (levels 8-12 in Table
C.1), “Intermediate Educated” refer to those that completed secondary school (levels 6-7
in Table C.1), and “Higher Educated” refer to those with at least some post-secondary
schooling (levels 1-5 in Table C.1). For the HRS we also distinguished between three
educational levels on the basis of years of education: those with less than 12 years of
education (29 percent of the sample), exactly 12 years of education (33 percent), and
more than 12 years of education (38 percent). Results were very similar.
As in most panels, there is considerable attrition in the BHPS and the HRS: 30 and
36 percent of the sample, respectively, is lost by the final wave. We repeated the analyses
using inverse probability weights to correct for sample attrition (Jones et al. 2006), and
find very similar point estimates. Hence attrition bias does not alter any of our main
conclusions.41
5 Discussion
This paper presents a theory of health behavior, in which the marginal cost of unhealthy
consumption consists not only of the direct monetary outlays, as in standard life cycle
models, but also of a health cost (value of health lost). As a result, wealth has two
competing effects: (i) a direct wealth effect increasing demand for unhealthy consumption
(wealth allows individuals to purchase more [unhealthy] consumption goods), and (ii) an
indirect health cost effect decreasing the demand for unhealthy consumption goods (the
health cost is higher for those who invest more in health, i.e. for wealthy individuals).
Which of the two effects dominates is theoretically ambiguous, but, according to our
theory, the indirect health cost effect is larger for the wealthy and for severely unhealthy
goods.
A first prediction of the theory is therefore that a wealth shock leads to increased
demand for healthy and moderately unhealthy consumption goods, but decreased demand
for severely unhealthy goods. This may provide an economic rationale for why wealthier
41We use probit regressions to predict the probability of remaining in the sample as a function of the
following initial wave explanatory variables: household income, age, age squared, sex, household size,
number of children, household income, education, health status, region, employment status, and marital
status. In the HRS models we additionally included race, health insurance, and whether father died,
mother died, father in law died or mother in law died and an indicator for being widowed. We use the
inverse of these predicted probabilities to weight each individual in the analyses of interest. BHPS results
show very similar point estimates, and while the HRS results also indicate very similar point estimates,
the effect on food expenditures is not statistically significant using the attrition weights, and the effect on
out-of-pocket expenditures on medical care is not significant in the FE Log Amount Inherited specification.
In contrast, the effect on smoking for non-smokers is statistically significant using the attrition weights in
the FE Log Amount Inherited specification.
24
individuals are more likely to drink moderately, but less likely to smoke and drink heavily
(Cutler and Lleras-Muney 2011). A second prediction is that the strength of the response
to an unexpected wealth shock is smallest for the wealthy and for a high degree of
unhealthiness of the consumption good, while predictions regarding health and age are
ambiguous.
We employ lottery winnings and inheritances as plausible exogenous variation in wealth
to test the theory’s predictions. Tables 6 and 7 provide a high-level overview of the
key findings (distilled from Tables 4 and 5). A + indicates a positive response and a
− indicates a negative response.42 Table 6 summarizes the results for the full BHPS
and HRS samples and serves to test prediction 1. We find strong and robust evidence
that wealth shocks increase the prevalence of drinking alcohol, but the number of drinks
and heavy drinking are not affected. This suggests that it is mostly modest, occasional
drinking that increases following a wealth shock. Apparently, for moderate drinking the
direct wealth effect dominates the indirect health cost effect, which is in line with what
the theory predicts (cf. hypothesis 1 that a wealth increase leads to increased demand
for moderately unhealthy behaviors). Heavy drinking is plausibly more detrimental to
health than drinking moderately and the absence of an effect on heavy drinking would be
consistent with the theoretical prediction that in such cases the health cost effect dampens
the direct wealth effect.
While a lottery win in the BHPS does not, inheritance receipt in the HRS does increase
the prevalence of smoking and the number of cigarettes smoked. These results are however
not necessarily inconsistent with one another. In the HRS we estimate a 1 percentage point
or 6.0 percent increase in the prevalence of smoking and a 0.9 increase in the number of
cigarettes smoked per day. In the BHPS results were insignificant, and we can rule out an
increase by more than 1.4 percentage points or 5.2 percent in the prevalence of smoking,
and an increase by more than 1.8 cigarettes per day (all at the 5 percent level). Thus
the absence of an effect in the BHPS does not rule out the effect sizes estimated in the
HRS. In addition there are substantial differences in age and in the size of the wealth
shocks between the BHPS and the HRS. Inheritances in the HRS represent a substantial
amount of money (the mean log amount received corresponds to around 40,000 US dollars),
whereas the amount won in the lottery is much smaller (mean log amount corresponding
to 40 British pounds, 1,500 Pounds among “Big Winners”). These differences in the size
of the wealth shock could simply render the effects on smoking insignificant in the BHPS
sample.43 A priori, we would classify smoking as very unhealthy. In light of the theory
42Effects are included if at least one effect size is recorded at a p-value of < 0.05 or at a p-value of at least
< 0.1 in two specifications. Note, that one has to be careful in comparing results from the BHPS directly
with those for the HRS as the wealth shocks employed, the demographics, countries and institutions and
panel questionnaires are different. Especially for the concepts “Exercise” and “Drinking” the BHPS and
HRS do not measure the same thing. While the BHPS question asks about engaging in sports and drinking
out, the HRS questions are broader and ask about any light physical activity and drinking in general.
43When restricting to lottery winners who won amounts over 1,000 or 2,500 British pounds the point
estimates increase slightly, but never reach statistical significance. It seems that the number of individuals
winning such amounts is too small (358 individuals win an amount over 1,000 British pounds, and only
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our findings suggest that the direct wealth effect still outweighs the indirect health cost
effect for smoking. The moderate increases in smoking are consistent with the notion that
smoking is more unhealthy than drinking (moderately) but not sufficiently unhealthy that
individuals reduce smoking in response to a wealth shock.
Table 7 summarizes the results for health by wealth subgroups and serves to test
prediction 2. The most striking pattern is that the least healthy (bottom left and right
quadrant) do not appear to change behavior in response to positive wealth shocks, with
the exception of the most wealthy least healthy engaging more in exercise and the least
wealthy least healthy more in social drinking. These results suggest that the least healthy
have greater health costs than the most healthy.
If healthy individuals have lower health costs, we confirm the theoretical prediction that
the most wealthy, least healthy (high health cost) do not change their unhealthy behaviors
while the least wealthy most healthy (low health cost) increase their unhealthy behaviors,
in response to a positive wealth shock. Additionally, and in line with hypothesis 2,
conditional on being in good health (low health cost), individuals with less wealth respond
stronger to a given wealth shock: the effect on smoking and drinking is generally larger
for the least wealthy than for the most wealthy, and the effect on cigarette consumption
is only apparent among the least wealthy (compare panel 2 with panel 3 in Tables 4 and
5).
The theory cannot unambiguously predict the relation between the response to a wealth
shock and age. Increasing expenditures on medical care (health investment) toward the
end of life suggests that the marginal cost of health investment piI(t) increases with age.
Depending on the relationship between the change in health ∂d∂CuH(t) and age, the elderly
could face a higher or lower health cost. The elderly seem to respond stronger to a positive
wealth shock, which may suggest their health costs are lower. But another plausible
explanation could be that they are more credit constrained or that they spend more of
their windfall gain immediately because the remaining lifetime over which consumption
can be smoothed is shorter for them.
Comparing our empirical results to the literature, we confirm the finding of Ettner
(1996) that alcohol consumption increases with income and of Kenkel et al. (2011) that
smoking and income are positively related in the US. We replicate the analysis of Apouey
and Clark (2010) and confirm their results, but identify substantial differences in the
characteristics between winners of small and large lottery amounts. When controlling
for individual fixed effects we confirm their finding of a positive relation between social
drinking and winning the lottery but we find that the effects on smoking and the number
of cigarettes vanish. We also estimated models similar to those of Kim and Ruhm
(2012) but find substantial differences in characteristics between inheritance recipients
receiving amounts over 10,000 US dollars (the cut-off used by Kim and Ruhm, 2012)
and recipients receiving inheritances below that amount. Including individual specific
fixed effects renders all effects, except for drinking, insignificant. Given the differences
126 individuals win over 2,500 British pounds) to draw strong conclusions in this regard.
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in characteristics across small and big lottery winners and inheritance recipients, the
estimates of both Apouey and Clark (2010) and Kim and Ruhm (2012) may be biased by
unobserved heterogeneity.
The empirical findings that the response to a wealth shock depends on wealth, health,
and on the unhealthiness of the good illustrate the importance of the health cost. These
empirical findings cannot be explained simply by a smaller direct wealth effect among
wealthier individuals, and provide empirical support for our theory.
Our theory is classical in the sense that it approximates human behavior by assuming
individuals are rational and forward looking. In addition we have not modeled uncertainty
such as health shocks. As a result, our theory predicts that individuals smooth
consumption. Yet, empirically we found evidence that most of the wealth is spent within
a few years following a wealth shock. This suggests that the observed responses are only
representative of short-term effects of wealth shocks, more in line with a model in which
individuals are credit constrained, or a behavioral model in which individuals spend most of
their windfall immediately. Future theoretical work would benefit from modeling the role
of credit constraints, and/or myopic behavior by, e.g., introducing hyperbolic discounting.
A more comprehensive theory may also wish to incorporate the extent to which a good is
addictive (e.g., Becker and Murphy 1988).
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics of control variables by lottery winning status, BHPS
Variable Non-winners Winners Small Win Big Win
Log Household Wealth 10.44 10.78∗∗∗ 10.75 11.21
Log Household Income 10.03 10.13∗∗∗ 10.13 10.18
Age 45.90 45.48∗∗∗ 45.44 46.17
Sex 0.44 0.57∗∗∗ 0.56 0.61∗∗∗
Region
Greater London (regions 1 and 2) 0.05 0.06∗∗∗ 0.06 0.06
South (regions 3 and 4) 0.17 0.24∗∗∗ 0.24 0.22
East (regions 5 and 6) 0.08 0.11∗∗∗ 0.11 0.09∗
West (regions 7 and 8) 0.06 0.06∗∗∗ 0.06 0.07
North (regions 9 to 16) 0.16 0.21∗∗∗ 0.21 0.21
Wales (region 17) 0.16 0.11∗∗∗ 0.11 0.10
Scotland (region 18) 0.17 0.18 0.18 0.18
Northern-Ireland (region 19) 0.14 0.03∗∗∗ 0.03 0.07∗∗∗
Household Size 2.86 2.77∗∗∗ 2.78 2.76
Number of Children 0.52 0.45∗∗∗ 0.45 0.54∗∗∗
Level of Education
Post-secondary Education (levels 1 to 5) 0.44 0.48∗∗∗ 0.48 0.43∗∗∗
Completed Secondary Education (levels 6 and 7) 0.26 0.27∗∗∗ 0.27 0.29
Less than Secondary Education (levels 8 to 13) 0.29 0.25∗∗∗ 0.25 0.28∗
Health Status
Excellent 0.23 0.22∗∗∗ 0.22 0.25∗∗
Good 0.46 0.49∗∗∗ 0.49 0.46
Fair 0.21 0.20∗∗∗ 0.20 0.19
Poor 0.08 0.07∗∗∗ 0.07 0.08
Very poor 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02
Marital Status
Married, Civil partnership 0.53 0.57∗∗∗ 0.57 0.52∗∗∗
Widowed 0.08 0.06∗∗∗ 0.05 0.07∗∗
Never Married 0.29 0.28 0.28 0.28
Separated, Divorced, Dissolved civil partnership 0.10 0.09∗∗∗ 0.09 0.13∗∗∗
Employment Status
Self-employed 0.07 0.07∗∗∗ 0.07 0.15∗∗∗
Employed, Maternity leave 0.50 0.58∗∗∗ 0.58 0.55∗
Disabled 0.05 0.04∗∗∗ 0.04 0.03
Unemployed, Government training schemes 0.04 0.02∗∗∗ 0.02 0.02
Retired 0.22 0.19∗∗∗ 0.19 0.19
Full-time student, Family care, Other 0.14 0.09∗∗∗ 0.09 0.06∗∗∗
Number of observations 149,333 16,155 15,274 881
* p-value < 0.1, ** p-value < 0.05, *** p-value < 0.01
Notes: Author’s calculations based on the 1997-2008 BHPS. Small Win refers to an amount won under
500 British pounds, and Big Win to an amount won above 500 British pounds. The asterisks denote
whether the difference in means between non-winners (column 2) and winners (column 3) and between
small winners (column 4) and big winners (column 5) are statistically significant. For ease of exposition,
the 19 regions are subdivided into eight sub regions, the 13 educational categories into three, marital status
into four and employment status into six categories (see Table C.1 for definitions of the 19 regions, 13
education levels, 7 marital status and 10 employment status categories).
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics of the control variables by inheritance receipt in the HRS
Variable No Inheritance Inheritance Small Inheritance Big Inheritance
Log Household Wealth 11.31 12.71∗∗∗ 12.03 12.86∗∗∗
Log Household Income 10.43 11.29∗∗∗ 10.83 11.40∗∗∗
Age 65.81 62.12∗∗∗ 61.54 62.25∗∗
Sex 0.42 0.46∗∗∗ 0.45 0.46
Race
White/Caucasian 0.81 0.95∗∗∗ 0.92 0.95∗∗∗
Black/African American 0.14 0.03∗∗∗ 0.05 0.03∗∗∗
Other 0.04 0.02∗∗∗ 0.02 0.02
Census Region
Northeast 0.16 0.14∗∗∗ 0.14 0.13
Midwest 0.25 0.31∗∗∗ 0.32 0.31
South 0.41 0.34∗∗∗ 0.36 0.33∗
West 0.17 0.21∗∗∗ 0.18 0.22∗∗∗
Other 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Household Size 2.29 2.27∗∗∗ 2.36 2.25∗∗∗
Number of Children 3.27 2.93∗∗∗ 3.09 2.90∗∗∗
Years of Education 12.18 13.86∗∗∗ 13.29 13.99∗∗∗
Health Status
Excellent 0.13 0.19∗∗∗ 0.17 0.20∗
Very Good 0.29 0.36∗∗∗ 0.34 0.37∗
Good 0.31 0.29∗∗∗ 0.30 0.29
Fair 0.19 0.12∗∗∗ 0.14 0.11∗∗
Poor 0.09 0.04∗∗∗ 0.05 0.04∗
Marital Status
Married, Married spouse absent 0.66 0.78∗∗∗ 0.75 0.79∗∗∗
Partnered 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03
Separated/Divorced (categories 4 to 6) 0.10 0.08∗∗∗ 0.10 0.07∗∗
Widow 0.18 0.09∗∗∗ 0.10 0.08∗∗
Never Married 0.03 0.02∗∗ 0.02 0.02
Employment Status 0.41 0.53∗∗∗ 0.53 0.53
Ever Smoked 0.58 0.57 0.60 0.56∗∗∗
Health Insurance 0.83 0.79∗∗∗ 0.77 0.80∗∗
Mother died 0.02 0.13∗∗∗ 0.11 0.13∗
Father died 0.01 0.05∗∗∗ 0.05 0.06∗
Mother in law died 0.02 0.10∗∗∗ 0.08 0.11∗∗∗
Father in law died 0.01 0.04∗∗∗ 0.03 0.04∗
Widowed 0.03 0.02∗∗∗ 0.02 0.02
Observations 146,165 6,859 1,233 5,626
* p-value < 0.1, ** p-value < 0.05, *** p-value < 0.01
Notes: Author’s calculations on basis of the 1992-2010 HRS. The asterisks denote whether the difference in
means between non-recipients (column 2) and recipients (column 3) and between small (column 4) and big
recipients (column 5) are statistically significant. Marital status is grouped into 5 categories for exposition
reasons (see Table C.2 for definitions of categories).
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Table 3: Descriptive statistics of the dependent and independent variables, for the full sample and for subgroups
Outcome Full sample Most Healthy Most Healthy Least Healthy Least Healthy Below age 50 Above age 50
Most Wealthy Least Wealthy Most Wealthy Least Wealthy
BHPS
Log Imputed Household Wealth 10.78 11.88 9.97 11.06 8.64 10.93 10.61
Log Household Income 10.13 10.45 9.88 10.23 9.63 10.28 10.00
Log Amount Won 3.70 3.73 3.73 3.60 3.66 3.73 3.67
Log Amount Won (Big Win) 7.33 7.39 7.30 7.26 7.26 7.37 7.28
Relative Amount Won (%) 0.08 0.03 0.20 0.06 0.69 0.07 0.10
Relative Amount Won (Big Win, %) 2.07 0.86 5.08 1.08 27.80 2.17 1.91
Log Food Expenditures 3.20 3.58 3.09 3.19 2.51 3.55 2.80
Smoking (%) 26.07 16.31 31.22 24.33 40.81 30.61 21.10
Log Number of Cigarettes 2.39 2.20 2.42 2.37 2.57 2.54 2.68
Drinking Out 3.21 3.43 3.24 3.09 2.76 3.68 2.69
Sports 3.78 4.14 3.84 3.58 3.01 4.09 3.45
HRS
Log Household Wealth 12.71 13.46 11.88 12.88 10.84
Log Amount Inherited 10.59 10.91 10.22 10.62 9.93
Relative Amount Inherited (%) 11.97 7.77 18.90 10.42 40.25
Log Food Expenditures 4.64 4.86 4.62 4.70 4.37
Smoking (%) 15.84 10.61 17.60 13.79 21.61
Log Number of Cigarettes 2.18 2.16 2.19 2.18 2.17
Drinking (%) 49.60 66.97 51.38 48.26 31.57
Log Number of Drinks 1.04 1.17 1.01 0.97 0.88
Heavy Drinking (%) 14.14 10.74 15.40 13.46 20.81
Light Physical Activity 3.33 3.60 3.45 3.24 3.01
Log Out-of-pocket Expenditures 6.41 6.74 6.02 7.06 5.73
Author’s calculations on basis of the 1997-2008 BHPS and 1992-2010 HRS. Note that Log Household Wealth and Log Household Income are
calculated on basis of the sample of lottery winners (BHPS) or inheritance recipients (HRS). Relative amounts are calculated by the ratio of
exp(log amount won)/ exp(log household wealth).
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Table 4: Estimates of the effect of lottery winnings – BHPS
Outcome FE Lottery FE Big FE Log Amount
Won Lottery Won Lottery Won
Full sample (panel 1)
Log Food Expenditures 0.0134 0.0959∗∗ 0.0069∗∗
N = 134,829 (0.0122) (0.0388) (0.0030)
Smoking 0.0003 −0.0047 0.0002
N = 134,829 (0.0024) (0.0091) (0.0006)
– Among Smokers −0.0032 0.0115 −0.0005
N = 34,678 (0.0062) (0.0237) (0.0015)
– Among Non-Smokers −0.0016 −0.0014 −0.0003
N = 100,151 (0.0016) (0.0053) (0.0004)
Log Number of Cigarettes −0.0112 0.0480 −0.0014
N = 34,678 (0.0173) (0.0601) (0.0042)
Drinking Out 0.0432∗∗∗ 0.1076∗ 0.0145∗∗∗
N = 74,142 (0.0138) (0.0566) (0.0036)
Sports 0.0588∗∗∗ −0.0424 0.0114∗∗
N = 61,848 (0.0215) (0.0842) (0.0054)
Most Healthy and Most Wealthy (panel 2)
Log Food Expenditures 0.0158 0.0089 0.0057
N = 49,252 (0.0169) (0.0478) (0.0041)
Smoking 0.0013 −0.0002 0.0004
N = 49,252 (0.0033) (0.0106) (0.0008)
– Among Smokers 0.0149 0.0272 0.0041
N = 7,838 (0.0130) (0.0393) (0.0031)
– Among Non-Smokers −0.0034 0.0025 −0.0006
N = 41,414 (0.0023) (0.0036) (0.0005)
Log Number of Cigarettes 0.0319 0.0568 0.0077
N = 7,838 (0.0364) (0.1070) (0.0089)
Drinking Out 0.0212 0.1730∗ 0.0105∗∗
N = 27,132 (0.0199) (0.0922) (0.0053)
Sports −0.0036 −0.0748 −0.0023
N = 22,303 (0.0304) (0.1264) (0.0074)
Most Healthy and Least Wealthy (panel 3)
Log Food Expenditures 0.0096 0.0529 0.0073
N = 44,414 (0.0238) (0.0748) (0.0057)
Smoking 0.0045 0.0087 0.0020∗
N =44,414 (0.0047) (0.0193) (0.0012)
– Among Smokers −0.0074 0.0711∗ 0.0006
N = 13,831 (0.0109) (0.0391) (0.0026)
– Among Non-Smokers 0.0005 −0.0027 0.0001
N = 30,583 (0.0029) (0.0150) (0.0007)
Log Number of Cigarettes −0.0308 0.1451 −0.0017
N =13,831 (0.0295) (0.0970) (0.0068)
Drinking Out 0.0517∗∗ 0.0821 0.0156∗∗
N = 24,441 (0.0259) (0.0943) (0.0066)
Sports 0.0784∗ 0.0147 0.0181∗
N = 20,383 (0.0428) (0.1668) (0.0110)
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Table 4: (continued)
Outcome FE Lottery FE Big FE Log Amount
Won Lottery Won Lottery Won
Least Healthy and Most Wealthy (panel 4)
Log Food Expenditures 0.0279 0.1572 0.0137∗
N = 18,996 (0.0307) (0.1343) (0.0077)
Smoking −0.0060 −0.0494∗ −0.0026
N = 18,996 (0.0065) (0.0298) (0.0017)
– Among Smokers −0.0024 −0.1230∗ −0.0043
N =4,563 (0.0163) (0.0736) (0.0042)
– Among Non-Smokers −0.0015 −0.0130 −0.0007
N = 14,433 (0.0041) (0.0135) (0.0011)
Log Number of Cigarettes 0.0217 −0.2287 −0.0034
N = 4,563 (0.0431) (0.1812) (0.0113)
Drinking Out 0.0687∗ 0.0969 0.0160
N = 10,468 (0.0385) (0.1600) (0.0100)
Sports 0.0914 0.1319 0.0232
N = 8,842 (0.0564) (0.2169) (0.0142)
Least Healthy and Least Wealthy (panel 5)
Log Food Expenditures −0.0088 0.3200∗∗ −0.0006
N = 19,104 (0.0432) (0.1257) (0.0105)
Smoking −0.0029 −0.0024 −0.0012
N = 19,104 (0.0072) (0.0216) (0.0017)
– Among Smokers −0.0084 0.0197 −0.0017
N = 7,819 (0.0116) (0.0450) (0.0029)
– Among Non-Smokers −0.0015 −0.0202 −0.0008
N = 11,285 (0.0051) (0.0129) (0.0012)
Log Number of Cigarettes −0.0298 0.1140 −0.0039
N = 7,819 (0.0357) (0.1323) (0.0090)
Drinking Out 0.0790∗ 0.1803 0.0312∗∗∗
N = 10,509 (0.0465) (0.1657) (0.0118)
Sports 0.1442∗∗ −0.3022 0.0229
N = 8,904 (0.0722) (0.2337) (0.0181)
Below 50 years old (panel 6)
Log Food Expenditures 0.0045 0.0851∗ 0.0059∗∗∗
N = 68,437 (0.0146) (0.0516) (0.0036)
Smoking 0.0007 0.0014 0.0003
N = 68,437 (0.0037) (0.0143) (0.0009)
– Among Smokers −0.0019 0.0199 −0.0000
N = 20,740 (0.0082) (0.0334) (0.0021)
– Among Non-Smokers −0.0036 0.0040 −0.0008
N = 47,697 (0.0028) (0.0085) (0.0007)
Log Number of Cigarettes −0.0217 0.0639 −0.0028
N = 20,740 (0.0229) (0.0841) (0.0057)
Drinking Out 0.0318∗ 0.0421 0.0103∗∗
N = 37,691 (0.0180) (0.0748) (0.0046)
Sports 0.0455 0.0026 0.0078
N = 30,658 (0.0291) (0.1167) (0.0071)
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Table 4: (continued)
Outcome FE Lottery FE Big FE Log Amount
Won Lottery Won Lottery Won
Above 50 years old (panel 7)
Log Food Expenditures 0.0186 0.1087∗ 0.0073
N = 66,392 (0.0192) (0.0576) (0.0047)
Smoking −0.0004 −0.0105 −0.0001
N = 66,392 (0.0030) (0.0114) (0.0008)
– Among Smokers −0.0067 −0.0163 −0.0019
N = 13,938 (0.0094) (0.0321) (0.0023)
– Among Non-Smokers −0.0002 −0.0045 −0.0000
N = 52,454 (0.0016) (0.0068) (0.0004)
Log Number of Cigarettes −0.0041 −0.0014 −0.0013
N = 13,938 (0.0264) (0.0850) (0.0064)
Drinking Out 0.0537∗∗∗ 0.1678∗∗ 0.0183∗∗∗
N = 36,451 (0.0207) (0.0826) (0.0054)
Sports 0.0703∗∗ −0.0608 0.0148∗
N = 31,190 (0.0312) (0.1193) (0.0079)
* p-value < 0.1, ** p-value < 0.05, *** p-value < 0.01
Notes: Author’s calculations on basis of the 1997-2008 BHPS. “FE Lottery Won” refers to model (17), “FE
Big Lottery Won” refers to model (18), and “FE Log Amount Lottery Won” refers to model (19). Note that
all models include the same set of control variables as in Table C.1. “Most Healthy” refer to those initially in
“Excellent” or “Good” self-reported health, and “Least Healthy” refer to those initially in “Fair”, “Poor”,
or “Very Poor” self-reported health. “Most Wealthy” and “Least Wealthy” include individuals that at first
observation are, respectively, above and below the age-wave-specific median imputed household wealth.
“Below 50 years old” are those that were below age 50 in 2008, and “Above 50 years old” are those that
were aged 50 or older in 2008.
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Table 5: Estimates of the effect of inheritance receipt – HRS
Outcome FE Inheritance FE Big Inheritance FE Log Amount
Inherited
Full sample (panel 1)
Log Food Expenditures 0.0487∗ −0.0256 0.0051∗∗
N = 77,720 (0.0256) (0.0666) (0.0025)
Smoking 0.0095∗∗∗ −0.0103 0.0009∗∗∗
N = 118,604 (0.0029) (0.0077) (0.0003)
– Among Smokers 0.0232 −0.0459 0.0021
N = 18,693 (0.0157) (0.0308) (0.0015)
– Among Non-Smokers 0.0021 0.0011 0.0002
N = 99,600 (0.0016) (0.0042) (0.0001)
Log Number of Cigarettes 0.1044∗ −0.1622 0.0094∗
N = 16,034 (0.0533) (0.1082) (0.0051)
Drinking 0.0137∗∗∗ 0.0224∗ 0.0012∗∗
N = 118,604 (0.0052) (0.0133) (0.0005)
Log Number of Drinks 0.0107 −0.0004 0.0006
N = 54,126 (0.0148) (0.0374) (0.0013)
Heavy Drinking 0.0054 0.0013 0.0006
N = 54,126 (0.0058) (0.0141) (0.0005)
Light Physical Activity −0.0080 −0.1177∗∗∗ −0.0012
N = 57,633 (0.0208) (0.0490) (0.0019)
Log Out-of-Pocket Med. Exp. 0.0448 0.0358 0.0050∗
N = 108,333 (0.0316) (0.0785) (0.0029)
Most Healthy and Most Wealthy (panel 2)
Log Food Expenditures 0.0105 0.0023
N = 20,554 (0.0385) (0.0036)
Smoking 0.0105∗∗∗ 0.0009∗∗∗
N = 31,278 (0.0038) (0.0003)
– Among Smokers 0.0199 0.0016
N = 3,395 (0.0281) (0.0026)
– Among Non-Smokers 0.0039∗ 0.0004∗∗
N = 27,789 (0.0021) (0.0002)
Log Number of Cigarettes 0.0498 0.0049
N = 2,901 (0.0890) (0.0080)
Drinking 0.0179∗∗ 0.0014∗∗
N = 31,278 (0.0075) (0.0007)
Log Number of Drinks 0.0167 0.0006
N = 19,073 (0.0188) (0.0017)
Heavy Drinking 0.0065 0.0005
N = 19,073 (0.0079) (0.0007)
Light Physical Activity −0.0636∗∗ −0.0055∗
N = 15,498 (0.0309) (0.0028)
Log Out-of-Pocket Med. Exp. 0.0594 0.0066∗
N = 28,514 (0.0437) (0.0039)
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Table 5: (continued)
Outcome FE Inheritance FE Big Inheritance FE Log Amount
Inherited
Most Healthy and Least Wealthy (panel 3)
Log Food Expenditures 0.0458 0.0042
N = 19,295 (0.0453) (0.0043)
Smoking 0.0225∗∗∗ 0.0021∗∗∗
N = 29,215 (0.0069) (0.0006)
– Among Smokers 0.0689∗∗ 0.0061∗∗
N = 5,152 (0.0304) (0.0030)
– Among Non-Smokers 0.0012 0.0001
N = 24,004 (0.0034) (0.0003)
Log Number of Cigarettes 0.2429∗∗ 0.0225∗∗
N = 4,423 (0.1033) (0.0101)
Drinking 0.0285∗∗∗ 0.0030∗∗∗
N = 29,215 (0.0108) (0.0010)
Log Number of Drinks 0.0272 0.0028
N = 13,587 (0.0311) (0.0030)
Heavy Drinking −0.0045 −0.0003
N = 13,587 (0.0118) (0.0012)
Light Physical Activity −0.0417 −0.0035
N = 14,319 (0.0427) (0.0042)
Log Out-of-Pocket Med. Exp. 0.0339 0.0027
N =26,527 (0.0718) (0.0068)
Least Healthy and Most Wealthy (panel 4)
Log Food Expenditures 0.0979∗∗ 0.0096∗∗
N = 20,475 (0.0471) (0.0045)
Smoking −0.0015 −0.0000
N =31,058 (0.0055) (0.0005)
– Among Smokers 0.0008 0.0008
N = 4,379 (0.0311) (0.0030)
– Among Non-Smokers 0.0001 0.0001
N = 26,586 (0.0032) (0.0003)
Log Number of Cigarettes 0.1246 0.0122
N = 3,737 (0.1066) (0.0101)
Drinking −0.0001 −0.0002
N = 31,058 (0.0102) (0.0009)
Log Number of Drinks −0.0161 −0.0014
N =13,836 (0.0304) (0.0027)
Heavy Drinking 0.0010 0.0003
N =13,836 (0.0125) (0.0011)
Light Physical Activity 0.1146∗∗∗ 0.0086∗∗
N = 15,012 (0.0417) (0.0038)
Log Out-of-Pocket Med. Exp. 0.0345 0.0051
N = 28,524 (0.0570) (0.0052)
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Table 5: (continued)
Outcome FE Inheritance FE Big Inheritance FE Log Amount
Inherited
Least Healthy and Least Wealthy (panel 5)
Log Food Expenditures 0.1035 0.0096
N =17,396 (0.0750) (0.0073)
Smoking 0.0045 0.0002
N = 27,053 (0.0107) (0.0011)
– Among Smokers 0.0072 0.0002
N =5,767 (0.0387) (0.0041)
– Among Non-Smokers 0.0021 0.0002
N = 21,221 (0.0065) (0.0006)
Log Number of Cigarettes 0.0421 0.0020
N = 4,973 (0.1331) (0.0135)
Drinking −0.0029 −0.0003
N = 27,053 (0.0174) (0.0016)
Log Number of Drinks −0.0149 −0.0014
N = 7,630 (0.0647) (0.0063)
Heavy Drinking 0.0464 0.0051∗
N =7,630 (0.0285) (0.0027)
Light Physical Activity 0.0489 0.0030
N = 12,804 (0.0790) (0.0077)
Log Out-of-Pocket Med. Exp. −0.0564 −0.0089
N = 24,768 (0.1266) (0.0126)
* p-value < 0.1, ** p-value < 0.05, *** p-value < 0.01
Notes: Author’s calculations on basis of the 1992-2010 HRS. “FE Inheritance” refers to model (17), “FE
Big Inheritance” refers to model (18), and “FE Log Amount Inherited” to model (19). Note that all
models include the same set of control variables as in Table C.2. “Most Healthy” are those in “Excellent”
or “Very Good” self-reported health at first observation in the panel, and “Least Healthy” are those in
“Good”, “Fair”, or “Poor” self-reported health at first observation. “Most Wealthy” and “Least Wealthy”
include individuals that at first observation are, respectively, above and below the age-wave-specific median
household wealth.
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Table 6: Summary of full sample effects
Outcome BHPS HRS
Smoking +
# Cigarettes +
Drinking + +
# Drinks N/A
Heavy Drinking N/A
Exercise +
OOP N/A
Notes: This table summarizes the results for the full BHPS and HRS samples, obtained from panel 1 of
Table 4 and panel 1 of Table 5. A + indicates a positive response and a − a negative response. Effects are
included if at least one effect size is recorded at a p-value of < 0.05 or in two specifications at a p-value of
at least < 0.1. OOP = out-of-pocket medical expenditures.
Table 7: Summary of wealth by health subgroup effects
Most Wealthy Least Wealthy
Outcome BHPS HRS BHPS HRS
Most Healthy Smoking + +
# Cigarettes +
Drinking + + + +
# Drinks N/A N/A
Heavy Drinking N/A N/A
Exercise - +
OOP N/A N/A
Least Healthy Smoking
# Cigs.
Drinking +
# Drinks N/A N/A
Heavy Drinking N/A N/A
Exercise +
OOP N/A N/A
Notes: This table summarizes the results for wealth by health subgroups of the BHPS and HRS panels,
obtained from panels 2 to 5 of Table 4 and panels 2 to 5 of Table 5. Rest as in Table 6.
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A First-order conditions
Associated with the Hamiltonian (equation 4) we have the following conditions:
q˙A(t) = −∂=(t)
∂A(t)
⇒
q˙A(t) = −δqA(t)⇔
qA(t) = qA(0)e
−δt, (20)
q˙H(t) = − ∂=(t)
∂H(t)
⇒
q˙H(t) = qH(t)d(t)− ∂U(t)
∂H(t)
e−βt − qA(0) ∂Y (t)
∂H(t)
e−δt ⇔
qH(t) = qH(0)e
∫ t
0 d(x)dx −
∫ t
0
[
∂U(s)
∂H(s)
e−βs + qA(0)
∂Y (s)
∂H(s)
e−δs
]
e
∫ t
s d(x)dxds, (21)
∂=(t)
∂I(t)
= 0⇒
qH(t) = qA(0)
{
pI(t)I(t)
1−α
αµI(t)
}
e−δt
≡ qA(0)piI(t)e−δt, (22)
∂=(t)
∂Ch(t)
= 0⇒
∂U(t)
∂Ch(t)
= qA(0)pCh(t)e
(β−δ)t + qH(t)
∂d(t)
∂Ch(t)
H(t)eβt
≡ qA(0) pCh(t)e(β−δ)t − qH(t)
ϕdCh(t)
piI(t)
eβt, (23)
∂=(t)
∂Cu(t)
= 0⇒
∂U(t)
∂Cu(t)
= qA(0)pCu(t)e
(β−δ)t + qH(t)
∂d(t)
∂Cu(t)
H(t)eβt
≡ qA(0) pCu(t)e(β−δ)t + qH(t)
pidCu(t)
piI(t)
eβt. (24)
Equation (23) combined with (22) provides the first-order condition for maximization
of the Hamiltonian (4) with respect to healthy consumption (equation 7). Similarly,
equation (24) combined with (22) provides the first-order condition for maximization of
the Hamiltonian (4) with respect to unhealthy consumption (equation 10). Using (22)
to obtain an expression for q˙H(t) and substituting the results for qH(t) and q˙H(t) in (21)
we find the first-order condition for maximization of the Hamiltonian (4) with respect to
investment in health (equation 5).
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B Comparative Dynamics
We are interested in the comparative dynamic effect of an increase in initial wealth A0
on the control variables healthy consumption and unhealthy consumption. We start by
taking the derivative of the first-order conditions with respect to initial wealth.
For the control variable healthy consumption the comparative dynamic effect of initial
wealth A0 is obtained from (7):
[
∂2U
∂C2h
− qA(0)piI(t) ∂
2d
∂C2h
H(t)e(β−δ)t
]
∂Ch
∂A0
=
[
1
qA(0)
∂U
∂Ch
]
× ∂qA(0)
∂A0
+
[
qA(0)
∂d
∂Ch
H(t)e(β−δ)t
]
× ∂piI
∂A0
+
[
qA(0)piI(t)
∂2d
∂Cu∂Ch
H(t)e(β−δ)t − ∂
2U
∂Cu∂Ch
]
× ∂Cu
∂A0
+
[
qA(0)piI(t)
∂d
∂Ch
e(β−δ)t − ∂
2U
∂H∂Ch
]
× ∂H
∂A0
. (25)
Or,
∂Ch
∂A0
≡ bq(t)∂qA(0)
∂A0
+ bpi(t)
∂piI
∂A0
+ bCu(t)
∂Cu
∂A0
+ bH(t)
∂H
∂A0
, (26)
where the coefficients bi(t) are defined by the transition from (25) to (26).
And, likewise, for unhealthy consumption the comparative dynamic effect of initial
wealth is obtained from (10):[
∂2U
∂C2u
− qA(0)piI(t) ∂
2d
∂C2u
H(t)e(β−δ)t
]
∂Cu
∂A0
=
[
1
qA(0)
∂U
∂Cu
]
× ∂qA(0)
∂A0
+
[
qA(0)
∂d
∂Cu
H(t)e(β−δ)t
]
× ∂piI
∂A0
+
[
qA(0)piI(t)
∂2d
∂Ch∂Cu
H(t)e(β−δ)t − ∂
2U
∂Ch∂Cu
]
× ∂Ch
∂A0
+
[
qA(0)piI(t)
∂d
∂Cu
e(β−δ)t − ∂
2U
∂H∂Cu
]
× ∂H
∂A0
. (27)
Or,
∂Cu
∂A0
≡ cq(t)∂qA(0)
∂A0
+ cpi(t)
∂piI
∂A0
+ cCh(t)
∂Ch
∂A0
+ cH(t)
∂H
∂A0
(28)
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where the coefficients ci(t) are defined by the transition from (27) to (28).
Now substitute (26) into (28) and vice versa to obtain
∂Ch
∂A0
=
bq(t) + bCu(t)cq(t)
1− cCh(t)bCu(t)
× ∂qA(0)
∂A0
+
bpi(t) + bCu(t)cpi(t)
1− cCh(t)bCu(t)
× ∂piI
∂A0
+
bH(t) + bCu(t)cH(t)
1− cCh(t)bCu(t)
× ∂H
∂A0
, (29)
and
∂Cu
∂A0
=
cq(t) + cCh(t)bq(t)
1− cCh(t)bCu(t)
× ∂qA(0)
∂A0
+
cpi(t) + cCh(t)bpi(t)
1− cCh(t)bCu(t)
× ∂piI
∂A0
+
cH(t) + cCh(t)bH(t)
1− cCh(t)bCu(t)
× ∂H
∂A0
. (30)
Equations (29) and (30) show that the effect of variation in initial wealth A0 can be
decomposed into its effect on (i) lifetime wealth, qA(0), (ii) health investment, piI(t), and
(iii) health, H(t). We assume diminishing returns to wealth, i.e. poor individuals derive
greater marginal life-time utility benefits from an additional increment of wealth than
wealthier individuals: ∂qA(0)∂A0 < 0 (a standard assumption made in the literature). The
signs of ∂piI(t)/∂A0 and of ∂H(t)/∂A0 in (29) and (30) are not known a priori, and we
will explore them further below.
For the control variable health investment, the comparative dynamic effect of initial
wealth A0 is obtained from (5):
∂
∂t
∂piI
∂A0
=
[
1
qA(0)2
∂U
∂H
e−(β−δ)t
]
× ∂qA(0)
∂A0
+ [d(t) + δ]× ∂piI
∂A0
+
[
piI(t)
∂d
∂Ch
− 1
qA(0)
∂2U
∂Ch∂H
e−(β−δ)t
]
× ∂Ch
∂A0
+
[
piI(t)
∂d
∂Cu
− 1
qA(0)
∂2U
∂Cu∂H
e−(β−δ)t
]
× ∂Cu
∂A0
+
[
− 1
qA(0)
∂2U
∂H2
e−(β−δ)t − ∂
2Y
∂H2
]
× ∂H
∂A0
. (31)
Or,
∂
∂t
∂piI
∂A0
≡ aq(t)∂qA(0)
∂A0
+ api(t)
∂piI
∂A0
+ aCh(t)
∂Ch
∂A0
+ aCu(t)
∂Cu
∂A0
+ aH(t)
∂H
∂A0
, (32)
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where the coefficients ai(t) are defined by the transition from (31) to (32).
Substituting (29) and (30) into (32) we arrive at
∂
∂t
∂piI
∂A0
=
{
aq(t) +
aCh(t) [bq(t) + bCu(t)cq(t)]
1− cCh(t)bCu(t)
+
aCu(t) [cq(t) + cCh(t)bq(t)]
1− cCh(t)bCu(t)
}
× ∂qA(0)
∂A0
+
{
api(t) +
aCh(t) [bpi(t) + bCu(t)cpi(t)]
1− cCh(t)bCu(t)
+
aCu(t) [cpi(t) + cCh(t)bpi(t)]
1− cCh(t)bCu(t)
}
× ∂piI
∂A0
+
{
aH(t) +
aCh(t) [bH(t) + bCu(t)cH(t)]
1− cCh(t)bCu(t)
+
aCu(t) [cH(t) + cCh(t)bH(t)]
1− cCh(t)bCu(t)
}
× ∂H
∂A0
.(33)
The dynamic equation for health (2) can be rewritten in terms of piI(t) using the
definition of piI(t) in (6) as follows:
∂H
∂t
= I(t)α − d(t)H(t)
=
(
αµI(t)piI(t)
pI(t)
) α
1−α
− d(t)H(t). (34)
Taking the derivative with respect to A0, it follows that
∂
∂t
∂H
∂A0
=
α
1− α
(
αµI(t)
pI(t)
) α
1−α
piI(t)
2α−1
1−α × ∂piI
∂A0
− ∂d
∂Ch
H(t)× ∂Ch
∂A0
− ∂d
∂Cu
H(t)× ∂Cu
∂A0
− d(t)× ∂H
∂A0
. (35)
Or,
∂
∂t
∂H
∂A0
≡ dpi(t) ∂piI
∂A0
+ dCh(t)
∂Ch
∂A0
+ dCu(t)
∂Cu
∂A0
+ dH(t)
∂H
∂A0
. (36)
Substitute (29) and (30) into (36) to obtain
∂
∂t
∂H
∂A0
=
{
dCh(t) [bq(t) + bCu(t)cq(t)]
1− cCh(t)bCu(t)
+
dCu(t) [cq(t) + cCh(t)bq(t)]
1− cCh(t)bCu(t)
}
× ∂qA(0)
∂A0
+
{
dpi(t) +
dCh(t) [bpi(t) + bCu(t)cpi(t)]
1− cCh(t)bCu(t)
+
dCu(t) [cpi(t) + cCh(t)bpi(t)]
1− cCh(t)bCu(t)
}
× ∂piI
∂A0
+
{
dH(t) +
dCh(t) [bH(t) + bCu(t)cH(t)]
1− cCh(t)bCu(t)
+
dCu(t) [cH(t) + cCh(t)bH(t)]
1− cCh(t)bCu(t)
}
× ∂H
∂A0
.(37)
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Equations (33) and (37) contain many higher-order terms and are intractable to work
with. For this reason, we make the simplifying assumption that first-order terms dominate
higher-order terms. In other words, that terms such as for example bCu(t)cq(t) (which
captures the indirect effect of wealth on healthy consumption through the effect that
wealth has on unhealthy consumption and unhealthy consumption in turn has on healthy
consumption) are smaller than bq(t) (which captures the direct effect of wealth on healthy
consumption).
The comparative dynamic effect of initial wealth on healthy and unhealthy
consumption is under this assumption approximated by equations (12) and (13),
respectively.
The equation for the change in health investment reduces to
∂
∂t
∂piI
∂A0
≈ aq(t)∂qA(0)
∂A0
+ api(t)
∂piI
∂A0
+ aH(t)
∂H
∂A0
, (38)
where it can be inferred that aq(t) > 0, api(t) > 0, and aH(t) > 0.
The expression for the change in health is
∂
∂t
∂H
∂A0
≈ dpi(t)× ∂piI
∂A0
+ dH(t)× ∂H
∂A0
, (39)
where dpi(t) > 0 and dH(t) < 0.
Using the comparative dynamic results in (38) and (39) we are ready to predict the sign
of ∂piI(t)∂A0 and
∂H(t)
∂A0
using the phase diagram in Figure 1. The figure shows on the y-axis
the variation of the marginal cost of health investment with respect to initial wealth ∂piI∂A0
and on the x-axis the variation of health with respect to initial wealth ∂H∂A0 . The phase
diagram is divided into four quadrants, where quadrant I corresponds to ∂piI∂A0 > 0 and
∂H
∂A0
> 0, quadrant II to ∂piI∂A0 < 0 and
∂H
∂A0
> 0, and so on. Associated with each point in
the phase diagram is a direction of motion, represented by the grey block arrows.
Since we know the signs of the coefficients in (38) and (39), and have made the common
assumption that ∂qA(0)∂A0 < 0, we can predict the sign of
∂
∂t
∂piI
∂A0
and ∂∂t
∂H
∂A0
, i.e., the direction
of motion, in all four quadrants of the phase diagram.
For example, consider the horizontal axis on the left-hand side of the figure
corresponding to ∂piI∂A0 = 0 and
∂H
∂A0
< 0. Equation (38) now reduces to
∂
∂t
∂piI
∂A0
= aq(t)
∂qA(0)
∂A0
+ aH(t)
∂H
∂A0
.
Since aq(t) > 0,
∂qA(0)
∂A0
< 0, aH(t) > 0, and
∂H
∂A0
< 0 we have ∂∂t
∂piI
∂A0
< 0. Likewise,
equation (39) reduces to
∂
∂t
∂H
∂A0
= dH(t)× ∂H
∂A0
,
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where dH(t) < 0 and
∂H
∂A0
< 0, and hence ∂∂t
∂H
∂A0
> 0. Since ∂∂t
∂piI
∂A0
< 0 and ∂∂t
∂H
∂A0
> 0
the direction of motion for points on the horizontal axis for negative values of ∂H∂A0 is in
the Southeastern direction, as represented by the grey block arrow. For positive values of
∂H
∂A0
the direction of motion for ∂piI∂A0 is ambiguous while
∂
∂t
∂H
∂A0
is negative, as represented
by the double block arrow. Note that for small values of ∂H∂A0 the direction of motion
for ∂piI∂A0 is toward lower values (toward the South) whereas for larger values of
∂H
∂A0
the
direction of motion for ∂piI∂A0 is toward higher values (toward the North). In a similar vein
the direction of motion in other parts of the phase diagram can be determined, as shown
by the remaining block arrows.
We can infer the optimal route over the lifecycle once we know the start and end point.
These are provided by the initial conditions and the transversality conditions. Since both
initial health H(0) = H0 and end-of-life health H(T ) = Hmin are fixed, it follows that
∂H(0)
∂A0
= ∂H(T )∂A0 = 0. In the phase diagram this implies that any admissible path should
begin and end on the vertical axis.
Now consider a path that starts on the vertical axis, but below the horizontal axis.
Any path will move into the Southwestern quadrant (quadrant III), and will stay there
indefinitely, as indicated by the dotted line, drawn for illustrative purposes. Because such
trajectories will never return to the vertical axis we can rule out any solutions associated
with ∂piI(0)∂A0 < 0. In contrast, paths starting at the vertical axis but above the horizontal
axis, could return to the vertical axis in finite time if they cross the horizontal axis and
enter quadrant IV at some point over the lifecycle. An example trajectory is shown for
illustrative purposes.
From this analysis we conclude that ∂piI(t)∂A0 ≥ 0, at least initially, and
∂H(t)
∂A0
≥ 0 ∀t.
Hence, higher initial wealth boosts health investment initially, leading to a higher health
stock throughout life, but eventually health investment falls below the unperturbed
(original) path after some age. The prediction that health investment falls below the
original path after some age is due to the assumption that life span T is fixed. In
such a model, health investment cannot be higher throughout life, as this would be
associated with a higher health stock at every age, violating the transversality condition
that H(T ) = Hmin. It can be shown that if the life span T is endogenous and free, higher
initial assets are associated with ∂H(t)∂A0 > 0 ∀t and length of life is extended (see Galama
and Van Kippersluis (2010) for details).
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C Tables
Table C.1: Variables in the BHPS
Variable Unit
Dependent variables
Food Expenditures 12 categories – 1 (< £ 10), 2 (£ 10 - 19), 3 (£ 20 - 29), 4 (£ 30 - 39), 5 (£ 40 - 49), 6 (£ 50 - 59)
(£ per month) 7 (£ 60 - 79), 8 (£ 80 - 99), 9 (£ 100 - 119), 10 (£ 120 - 139), 11 (£ 140 - 159), 12 (≥ £ 160); in 2005 British pounds
Smoking Binary: 0 if not smoking, 1 if smoking currently
Number of Cigarettes Continuous, per day
Drinking Out 5 categories – 1 (Never, almost never), 2 (Once a year or less), 3 (Several times a year),
4 (At least once a month), 5 (At least once a week)
Sports 5 categories – 1 (Never, almost never), 2 (Once a year or less), 3 (Several times a year),
4 (At least once a month), 5 (At least once a week)
Independent variables
Household Wealth (£) Continuous – only available in 2000, 2005; in 2005 British pounds
Lottery Winnings Binary: 1 if won the lottery, 0 if not
Amount Lottery Won (£) Continuous, in 2005 British pounds
Big Win Binary: 1 if Prize Won bigger than 500 British pounds, 0 if not
Control variables
Household Income (£) Continuous, annual gross, in 2005 British pounds
Age Continuous, years
Sex Binary: 0 if female, 1 if male
Region 19 regions – 1 (Inner London), 2 (Outer London), 3 (Rest of South East), 4 (South West), 5 (East Anglia)
6 (East Midlands), 7 (West Midlands Conurbation), 8 (Rest of West Midlands), 9 (Greater Manchester)
10 (Merseyside), 11 (Rest of North West), 12 (South Yorkshire), 13 (West Yorkshire)
14 (Rest of Yorks & Humberside), 15 (Tyne & Wear), 16 (Rest of North), 17 (Wales), 18 (Scotland), and 19 (Northern Ireland)
Household Size Continuous
Number of Children Continuous
Level of Education 13 categories – 1 (Higher Degree), 2 (First Degree), 3 (Teaching Qualification), 4 (Other Higher Qualification),
5 (Nursing Qualification), 6 (GCE A Levels), 7 (GCE O Levels or Equivalent),
8 (Commercial Qualification, No O Levels), 9 (CSE Grade 2-5, Scottish Grade 4-5),
10 (Apprenticeship), 11 (Other Qualification), 12 (No Qualification), 13 (Still At School, no Qualification)
Health Status 5 categories – 1 (Excellent), 2 (Good), 3 (Fair), 4 (Poor), 5 (Very Poor)
Marital Status 7 categories – 1 (Married), 2 (Separated), 3 (Divorced), 4 (Widowed), 5 (Never married),
6 (Civil partnership), 7 (Dissolved civil partnership)
Employment Status 10 categories – 1 (Self-employed), 2 (Employed), 3 (Unemployed), 4 (Retired), 5 (Maternity leave),
6 (Family care), 7 (Full-time student), 8 (Disabled), 9 (Government training scheme), 10 (Other)
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Table C.2: Variables in the HRS
Variable Unit
Dependent variables
Food Expenditures ($) Continuous, in 2005 US dollars, per week
Smoking Binary: 0 if not smoking, 1 if smoking currently
Number of Cigarettes Continuous, per day
Drinking Binary: 0 if does not drink, 1 if drinks
Number of Drinks Continuous, weekly
Heavy Drinking Binary: 0 if less than 3 drinks on an occasion, 1 if more
Light Physical Activity 5 categories: – 1) Never, 2), 1 to 3 times per month, 3) Once per week,
4) Less than once per week, 5) Every day
Out-of-Pocket Medical Expenditures ($) Continuous, in 2005 US dollars, since last wave
Independent variables
Household Wealth ($) Continuous, in 2005 US dollars
Inheritance Binary: 0 if no inheritance, 1 if received inheritance in past two years
Amount Inherited ($) Continuous, in US dollars
Big Inheritance Binary: 0 if Amount Inherited < $ 10,000, 1 if ≥ $ 10,000
Control variables
Household Income ($) Continuous, annual gross, 2005 US dollars
Age Continuous, in years
Sex Binary: 0 if female, 1 if male
Race 3 categories – 1) White/Caucasian, 2) Black/African American, 3) Other
Census Region 5 categories – 1) Northeast, 2) Midwest, 3) South, 4) West, 5) Other
Household Size Continuous
Number of Children Continuous
Years of Education Continuous, in years of schooling
Health Status 5 categories – 1) Excellent, 2) Very Good, 3) Good, 4) Fair, 5) Poor
Marital Status 8 categories – 1) Married, 2) Married, spouse absent, 3) Partnered, 4) Separated,
5) Divorced, 6) Separated/Divorced, 7) Widow, 8) Never married
Employment Status Binary: 0 if not working for pay, 1 if working for pay
Ever Smoked Binary: 0 if never smoked, 1 if ever smoked
Health Insurance Binary: 0 if no health insurance, 1 if health insurance
Mother Died Binary: 1 if mother died in the wave, 0 if not
Father Died Binary: 1 if father died in the wave, 0 if not
Mother in Law Died Binary: 1 if mother in law died in the wave, 0 if not
Father in Law Died Binary: 1 if father in law died in the wave, 0 if not
Widowed Binary: 1 if widowed in the wave, 0 if not
50
Table C.3: Benchmark OLS estimates
Outcome OLS Household OLS Big OLS Log Amount
Wealth Lottery Won Lottery Won
BHPS
Log Food Expenditures 0.0518∗∗∗ 0.2678∗∗∗ 0.0577∗∗∗
N = 134,829 (0.0044) (0.0383) (0.0087)
Smoking −0.0183∗∗∗ 0.0364 0.0108∗∗∗
N = 134,829 (0.0013) (0.0222) (0.0038)
Log Number of Cigarettes −0.0204∗∗∗ 0.0914 0.0350∗∗∗
N =34,678 (0.0041) (0.0662) (0.0121)
Drinking Out 0.0066 0.2486∗∗∗ 0.0701∗∗∗
N = 54,247 (0.0056) (0.0725) (0.0121)
Sports 0.0465∗∗∗ 0.0662 0.0224
N =42,625 (0.0063) (0.0935) (0.0152)
Outcome OLS Household OLS Big OLS Log Amount
Wealth Amount Inherited Inherited
HRS
Log Food Expenditures 0.0370∗∗∗ 0.0767 0.0382∗∗
N = 77,720 (0.0033) (0.0629) (0.0183)
Smoking −0.0080∗∗∗ −0.0322∗∗ −0.0004
N = 118,604 (0.0009) (0.0157) (0.0031)
Log Number of Cigarettes 0.0009 −0.4276∗∗∗ −0.0581∗∗
N = 16,034 (0.0042) (0.1040) (0.0285)
Drinking 0.0147∗∗∗ 0.0406∗∗ 0.0064
N = 118,604 (0.0010) (0.0204) (0.0047)
Log Number of Drinks 0.0173∗∗∗ 0.0799∗ 0.0100
N =108,333 (0.0018) (0.0467) (0.0103)
Heavy Drinking −0.0006 0.0037 0.0027
N =108,333 (0.0005) (0.0112) (0.0026)
Light Physical Activity 0.0433∗∗∗ −0.0634 −0.0080
N = 57,633 (0.0026) (0.0535) (0.0104)
Log Out-of-pocket Expenditures 0.2679∗∗∗ 0.1295 0.0624∗∗∗
N =108,333 (0.0080) (0.1141) (0.0228)
* p-value < 0.1, ** p-value < 0.05, *** p-value < 0.01
Notes: Author’s calculations based on the 1997-2008 BHPS and 1992-2010 HRS. For the BHPS analyses employing the log of household wealth,
the sample size is reduced to N=17,544, because this measure is only available in the years 2000 and 2005 (first column “OLS Household
Wealth” in the top half of the table). All models include the control variables first lag of household income, age, age-squared, sex, race
dummies, lagged region dummies, lagged household size, lagged number of children, education, lagged self-reported health, lagged marital
status, lagged employment status and interactions between time and region dummies. For the HRS, all models also include controls for
ever smoked, health insurance, whether mother died, father died, mother in-law died, or father in-law died and whether widowed since last
observation.
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